United States v. Dashunda Harmon
681 F. App'x 152
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Harmon and Singletary were jointly indicted for conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence arising from a 2013 M&T Bank robbery in Dover, Delaware.
- Phillip Yates, a co-participant who confessed and testified for the government, described recruiting and transporting the defendants to a rendezvous; he testified the two women agreed to wait and drive the robbers away for payment.
- On cross-examination, defense counsel confronted Yates with text messages suggesting drug-dealing; Yates denied those allegations, prompting defense counsel to allege possible perjury after trial.
- Both defendants were convicted on the conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting counts; they moved for new trials asserting the government failed to correct Yates’s alleged false testimony; Harmon also moved for acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence and sought a heightened corroboration rule for co-conspirator testimony.
- The District Court denied the new-trial and acquittal motions, finding no proof Yates perjured himself, no government knowledge of perjury, the statements were not material to the robbery charges, and that a reasonable jury could convict based on the evidence and impeachment presented.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning the alleged false testimony was not material, the defense thoroughly impeached Yates before the jury, no special corroboration rule was warranted, and sufficient evidence supported the convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| New trial based on government failure to correct perjured testimony | Harmon/Singletary: Government failed to disclose or correct Yates’s false testimony about drug dealing, violating due process | Government: No evidence Yates perjured himself or that prosecutors knew; impeachment was presented to jury | Denied — defendants failed to show perjury, knowledge, materiality, or reasonable likelihood verdict affected |
| Materiality of alleged false testimony | Defendants: Yates’s false statements about drug dealing undermined his credibility and could have affected the verdict | Government: Statements unrelated to robbery details; jury was instructed to weigh credibility | Denied — statements not material to robbery testimony and jury had full impeachment evidence |
| Sufficiency of the evidence (Rule 29) | Harmon: Evidence insufficient to sustain convictions; risk of conviction on uncorroborated co-conspirator testimony requires heightened standard | Government: Yates’s testimony plus corroborating eyewitness/circumstantial evidence sufficed; no corroboration requirement under Third Circuit | Denied — viewing evidence in government's favor, a reasonable jury could convict; no heightened corroboration rule adopted |
| Adoption of heightened corroboration rule for co-conspirator testimony | Harmon: Court should require corroboration/trustworthiness where co-conspirator testimony may be false | Government/precedent: Third Circuit does not require corroboration when defense can cross-examine | Denied — court declines to create new rule; existing precedent controls |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2015) (standard of review for new-trial denial)
- United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673 (3d Cir. 1993) (standard for reviewing sufficiency challenges)
- United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2008) (elements required to obtain new trial based on perjured testimony)
- United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2002) (no corroboration requirement for co-conspirator testimony where cross-examination is available)
- United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006) (jury credibility determinations and viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
- United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005) (courts must not usurp jury’s role in weighing credibility)
- United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 2002) (insufficiency relief is confined to clear prosecution failure)
