United States v. Darryl Parker
871 F.3d 590
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Members of the One-Nine gang recruited non-felons as "straw purchasers" to buy firearms that were distributed among gang members during an ongoing feud with the Taliban in North Minneapolis; multiple defendants were indicted on a conspiracy to possess firearms (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 922(g)(1)) and related possession counts.
- Veltrez Black was tried; evidence placed him repeatedly in the presence of One-Nine members and multiple firearms, social-media posts and letters showed gang affiliation and motive, and DNA mixtures on some guns implicated him; jury convicted Black of the conspiracy and of a separate possession count (later vacated on appeal).
- Tywin Bender was convicted of the conspiracy and of conspiring to retaliate against government witnesses after sending threatening emails from prison; he challenged jury instructions (including a First Amendment defense) and his sentence.
- Jabari Johnson and Darryl Parker pleaded guilty and received within-Guidelines sentences (60 months for conspiracy; concurrent 78 months for possession); both appealed sentence-related claims (Johnson argued inadequate explanation and failure to consider § 3553(a) factors; Parker challenged substantive reasonableness).
- On appeal the court: affirmed Black’s conspiracy conviction but reversed Black’s possession conviction for insufficient evidence and remanded for resentencing; affirmed Bender’s retaliation conviction but vacated Bender’s sentence for a Guidelines miscalculation and remanded for resentencing; affirmed Johnson’s and Parker’s sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of gang-violence evidence and mistrial motion (Black) | Gov: gang background was admissible as context, motive, and to rebut a "mere presence" defense | Black: evidence was inflammatory, prejudicial, and sought conviction by association | Admitted; no abuse of discretion — gang evidence was relevant to motive, knowledge, and rebuttal of mere-presence defense |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy (Black) | Gov: circumstantial evidence (presence with guns, DNA mixtures, social-media, admissions) shows tacit agreement and overt acts | Black: mere presence and association insufficient to prove membership in conspiracy | Affirmed — evidence, viewed in prosecution's favor, supported conspiracy conviction |
| Sufficiency of evidence for possession (Black) | Gov: furtive movements, flight, location of recovered gun along the chase route, and other inferences show possession beyond speculation | Black: gap in video, no eyewitness of throwing, no fingerprints/DNA on gun; all inferences speculative | Reversed — evidence insufficient to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| First Amendment jury instruction (Bender) | Bender: emails were protected speech (no true threat); jury should get instruction on free-speech defense | Gov: messages were intended to intimidate and instruct violence; evidence shows intent to retaliate | Denied — evidence supported intent to threaten/retaliate; First Amendment instruction not warranted |
| Jury instruction that conspiracy requires multiple conspirators (Bender) | Bender: acquittal of co-conspirator means he could not have conspired with another; requested explicit instruction | Bender: sought instruction clarifying that one cannot conspire alone | Denied as unnecessary — jury was instructed a conspiracy requires two or more and the evidence supported Bender's conspiracy with an acquitted codefendant |
| Sentencing enhancement for obstruction (Bender) | Gov/District Ct: applied § 3C1.1 enhancement and grouped related offenses to set Guidelines range | Bender: enhancement improper because retaliation occurred after guilty plea/trial and did not obstruct the instant offense | Vacated sentence — Galaviz controls; enhancement inapplicable where retaliation could not have been intended to obstruct the instant offense; remand for resentencing |
| Procedural/substantive reasonableness of sentences (Johnson, Parker) | Johnson: court failed adequately to justify sentence and failed to weigh § 3553(a) factors; sought variance; Parker: sentence greater than necessary | Gov: court considered arguments and § 3553(a); within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable | Affirmed — record shows district court considered arguments and applied discretion; sentences not procedurally or substantively unreasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001) (standard for reviewing denial of mistrial)
- United States v. Thunder, 745 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2014) (standard for reviewing sufficiency and jury instructions)
- United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 2005) (admissibility of gang-association evidence to show motive/opportunity)
- United States v. Gaines, 859 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 2017) (gang-related evidence admissible when explanatory and not unduly prejudicial)
- United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2007) (sufficiency of conspiracy proof; tacit agreement standard)
- United States v. Chatmon, 742 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2014) (furtive movement and constructive possession analysis)
- United States v. Garrett, 648 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2011) (flight plus eyewitness testimony can support possession conviction)
- United States v. Galaviz, 687 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2012) (limits on obstruction-of-justice enhancement when retaliation occurs after plea/trial)
- Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (U.S. 1960) (constructive amendment of indictment / jury instructions must track indictment)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (U.S. 2015) (mens rea requirement for threatening communications; relevance to intent instructions)