United States v. Darnell Dunn, 76 F.4th 1062

Background

Early-morning drive-by shooting at Brittney Jones; a black SUV that fired at her car was later stopped by Officer Sweeney.
At first stop, Dunn (front passenger) gave an alias and the vehicle was released; the next night Dunn was stopped in a different vehicle and a .40 cal handgun fell from under him.
Crime-scene testing linked that handgun to the earlier shooting; Dunn and the driver, his cousin Justin Lindsey, were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Lindsey pleaded guilty and at his plea hearing claimed ownership of the gun and that Dunn did not know about it; Lindsey invoked the Fifth at Dunn’s trial and was unavailable.
The district court excluded Lindsey’s plea-hearing testimony as hearsay; the government cross-examined Dunn about Crips gang membership (and introduced a Facebook post), the jury convicted Dunn, and the court imposed an ACCA sentence (180 months) after finding three prior violent-felony convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of Lindsey’s plea-hearing testimony (hearsay/Rule 804)	Lindsey’s plea testimony was former testimony or a statement-against-interest and admissible to show Dunn lacked knowledge	Government: plea hearing motive differed; Lindsey’s exculpatory statements were not against his penal interest and lacked trustworthiness	Excluded: no similar motive at plea hearing for the government to develop testimony; statements not sufficiently against Lindsey’s penal interest or corroborated under Rule 804(b)(3) or Rule 807
Admission of gang evidence / cross-exam about Crips membership	Gang evidence was unfair character evidence and should be excluded under Rule 404(b) / Rule 403	Government: gang evidence was intrinsic to proving knowing possession and thus admissible	Admissible: evidence was intrinsic (relevant to knowing possession and prior night’s shooting) and probative value not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1)	Statute overbroad and infringes right to bear arms	Government: longstanding felon prohibition remains valid after Heller and Bruen	No plain error: court affirmed constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) consistent with precedent
Sentencing — ACCA predicate convictions and separate-occasions finding	One prior (3rd-degree assault) was a juvenile act; alternatively, jury should determine whether priors occurred on different occasions	Government: assault was an adult conviction therefore not juvenile; judge can find separate occasions under circuit precedent	Affirmed: assault counted as a violent felony (adult conviction); no plain error in judicial findings about separate occasions and no prejudice shown

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard of review for hearsay rulings)
United States v. Preciado, 336 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2003) (motive to develop testimony at prior proceeding)
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (limits on admissible portions of statements against interest)
United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2003) (Rule 807 trustworthiness analysis)
United States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2014) (prior possession relevant to later possession; intrinsic evidence)
United States v. Jackson, 913 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2019) (intrinsic-evidence framework)
United States v. Gaines, 859 F.3d 1128 (8th Cir. 2017) (Rule 403 unfair-prejudice analysis)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognition of individual right but upholding longstanding prohibitions)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2122 (2022) (Second Amendment framework)
United States v. Ronning, 6 F.4th 851 (8th Cir. 2021) (adult conviction not treated as juvenile delinquency for ACCA)
United States v. Robinson, 43 F.4th 892 (8th Cir. 2022) (judge may determine separate-occasions issue at sentencing)
Wooden v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022) (single factor like time or place can distinguish occasions)