United States v. Daniel Scott, Sr., 16-6577

Background

Daniel Scott, Sr. was tried and convicted of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and distribution (21 U.S.C. § 846), (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956), and (3) animal fighting conspiracy (7 U.S.C. § 2156); he pled guilty to the animal-fighting count prior to trial.
Investigation uncovered a Texas-based drug trafficking organization (DTO) supplying Memphis; key players included supplier Juan Carlos Flores, distributor Horris Carpenter, courier Cordell Wuthrich, and Scott’s son, Daniel Scott, Jr.
Evidence at trial: controlled buy arrest of Scott, Jr. with ~5 kg cocaine, intercepted calls, pole-camera video of meetings at Horris Carpenter’s residence, seizure of $210,000 (April 2, 2015) and 28 kg cocaine (May 21, 2015) from Wuthrich, and testimony from Scott, Jr., Wuthrich, investigators, and an expert investigator (Hoing).
Defense objections challenged a variance between the indictment and proof, admission of Hoing’s expert testimony (and Confrontation Clause implications), sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct in closing, and the district court’s drug-quantity attribution at sentencing.
The district court sentenced Scott to 180 months on the drug counts (downward variance from guidelines based on 16 kg attributed) and 60 months on the animal-fighting count; the Sixth Circuit affirmed on all issues.

Issues

Issue	Scott's Argument	Government's Position	Held
Variance between indictment (single conspiracy) and proof (multiple conspiracies)	Trial evidence only supported multiple, separate conspiracies; thus indictment variance prejudiced him	Evidence supported a single "chain" conspiracy connecting members and transactions	No reversible variance; evidence could reasonably be construed as a single conspiracy
Admission of expert testimony (Hoing) and Confrontation Clause	Hoing relied on co-defendant/confidential-informant statements (testimonial) and thus violated Crawford; methodology unreliable	Hoing offered independent expert opinion based on experience and permissible reliance on underlying hearsay under Rule 703	Admission was not an abuse of discretion; testimony did not violate Confrontation Clause as mere conduit
Sufficiency of the evidence for conspiracy convictions	Evidence was circumstantial, relied on accomplice/expert hearsay, and failed to connect Scott to key drug seizures	Circumstantial evidence, co-conspirator testimony, intercepted calls, and video/pole-camera evidence were sufficient for a rational jury to convict	Evidence sufficient; reasonable juror could find Scott knowingly participated in the chain conspiracy
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument	Closing description of drugs as "poison" and references to law enforcement efforts inflamed jurors and vouched for witnesses	Comment was isolated, described evidence/seizures, and did not improperly ask jury to send a message or vouch	Not flagrant misconduct; statement permissible and did not require reversal
Drug-quantity attribution at sentencing (Relevant Conduct)	Only 2–3.5 kg attributable to Scott; 16 kg not supported by record	16 kg was reasonably foreseeable based on co-conspirator testimony, interceptions, cash seizures, and Scott's role	District court’s 16 kg finding was not clearly erroneous; downward variance showed caution

Key Cases Cited

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (variance between indictment and proof standard)
Warner v. United States, 690 F.2d 545 (chain conspiracy analysis)
Swafford v. United States, 512 F.3d 833 (single-conspiracy proof standard)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause testimonial hearsay rule)
Bourjaily v. United States, 781 F.2d 539 (inferring agreement from interdependent enterprise)
Lombardozzi v. United States, 491 F.3d 61 (expert used as conduit vs. independent expert opinion)
Gibbs v. United States, 182 F.3d 408 (insufficient evidence where no proof of agreement to charged conspiracy)