United States v. Daniel Garcia
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18001
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Garcia was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) for using a pipe bomb to damage a rented apartment building and a Chevrolet Tahoe; the jury convicted him and found both the building and vehicle were "used in interstate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate commerce."
- Evidence: explosive remnants at the apartment site (galvanized pipe, propane canisters, cardboard with AIMS inverter model number), damage to the building, and a similar pipe bomb and AIMS inverter receipt found at Garcia’s home; ATF analysis linked materials; latent prints on related devices.
- Additional evidence placed Garcia at a gym shortly before the explosion (check-in records and surveillance timing disputed), and testimony connected Garcia to possession of a similar device and the AIMS inverter purchase.
- Garcia moved to dismiss and later for acquittal arguing the government failed to prove the § 844(i) Commerce Clause jurisdictional element (no sufficient interstate commerce effect), and he challenged the district court’s jury instruction and § 844(i) as facially unconstitutional.
- The district court denied dismissal and Rule 29 motion; Garcia appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, resting its decision on precedent treating rented apartment buildings as per se affecting interstate commerce.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to satisfy § 844(i) Commerce Clause element | Garcia: government failed to show the damage substantially affected interstate commerce | Government: apartment was rented, advertised online, had out-of-state residents, and was damaged by the explosive — satisfying § 844(i) | Court: Evidence sufficient as to the rented apartment under Russell/Gomez; affirmed conviction |
| Jury instruction on "used in interstate commerce" for apartment and vehicle | Garcia: proposed instruction requiring active commercial use; current instruction too broad | Government: instruction that rental property is "used in interstate commerce" is correct; vehicle instruction permitted | Held: Court accepted district court’s apartment instruction and did not need to resolve vehicle issue because apartment alone satisfied jurisdiction |
| Constitutionality of § 844(i) (facial and as-applied) after Lopez/Morrison | Garcia: Morrison/Lopez undermine Russell and make § 844(i) unconstitutional when applied to local conduct | Government: § 844(i) contains a jurisdictional element addressing commerce; rental property is economic activity within Congress’s commerce powers | Held: § 844(i) upheld; Russell and Gomez remain binding and distinguishable from Morrison (non‑economic activity) |
| Whether Morrison implicitly overrules Russell’s aggregation rationale | Garcia: Morrison undermines Russell’s aggregation logic | Government: Russell remains good law and was followed by subsequent Supreme Court and circuit cases | Held: Court declined to treat Morrison as overruling Russell; followed binding precedent (Russell, Gomez) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limits Congress’s commerce power for non‑economic activity)
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (struck down federal statute as exceeding Commerce Clause for gender‑motivated crimes)
- Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985) (rental real estate is an activity affecting interstate commerce for § 844(i))
- United States v. Gomez, 87 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 1996) (apartment rental use per se satisfies § 844(i) jurisdictional element)
- United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2005) (applies Russell/Gonzales reasoning post‑Morrison; treats rental property as commerce‑affecting)
- Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (distinguishes owner‑occupied residences from rental property under § 844(i))
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (Congress may regulate local economic activity that, in aggregate, affects interstate commerce)
- United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (discusses limits of "used in interstate commerce" language)