United States v. Daniel Dvorkin
799 F.3d 867
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Dvorkin, a debtor facing an $8.2 million state-court judgment, sought to hire a hitman to kill creditor Larry Meyer and communicated that plan to Robert Bevis, a firearms-store owner and private investigator. Bevis became an FBI cooperating witness after reporting Dvorkin.
- Recorded and corroborated contacts between Dvorkin and Bevis occurred in April–May 2012: voicemail (Apr 5), in-person offers (Apr 6), telephone and meetings (Apr 18, Apr 30, May 7), and other communications; Dvorkin offered $50,000 and provided Meyer’s LinkedIn info.
- The FBI intervened, placed Meyer under surveillance, and confronted Dvorkin; Dvorkin later told Bevis (May 11) the plan was stopped and he would pursue legal options.
- A grand jury indicted Dvorkin on five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (use of interstate-commerce facility with intent that a murder be committed for hire) and one count under 18 U.S.C. § 373 (solicitation of another to commit a violent felony). A jury convicted him on all counts; Dvorkin appealed.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit considered sufficiency of the evidence for § 1958 and § 373, the availability of a § 373(b) renunciation defense, limits on cross-examination under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), and alleged prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal argument.
Issues
| Issue | Dvorkin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1958 requires proof of an actual murder-for-hire agreement | §1958 requires proof of a promise or agreement (an agreement element) beyond intent | §1958 requires only use of interstate-commerce facility with intent that a murder-for-hire be committed; no separate agreement element | Court: §1958 does not require an actual agreement—only the requisite intent (affirming convictions) |
| Whether evidence sufficed for solicitation under § 373(a) | No agreement or economic understanding with Bevis; no strongly corroborative circumstances | Repeated solicitations, $50,000 in untraceable funds, loan offer, and acquiring victim info strongly corroborate intent and solicitation | Court: Evidence sufficient to sustain § 373 conviction |
| Whether Dvorkin established voluntary, complete renunciation under § 373(b) | He renounced on Apr 30, May 7, and May 11, preventing the crime | (1) By Apr 18 Bevis had already completed the solicited acts as Dvorkin believed; (2) later statements were conditional or motivated by detection risk | Court: Renunciation defense fails — defendant did not prevent the crime and renunciations were not voluntary/complete |
| Whether exclusion of cross-exam about third-party findings (Illinois Secretary of State order, civil complaint) violated Rule 608(b) | Court misapplied Rule 608(b) by barring questions about sanctions/complaints that bear on truthfulness | The court acted within discretion; but even if error, evidence of guilt overwhelming | Court: Court misapplied Rule 608(b) but the error was harmless given overwhelming proof; conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653 (7th Cir.) (interpreting §1958 nexus and intent requirements)
- United States v. Preacher, 631 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir.) (holding §1958 complete upon use with requisite intent)
- United States v. Driggers, 559 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.) (defining §1958 elements as use with intent that murder be committed for hire)
- Ng v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir.) (noting §1958 requires intent to enter murder-for-hire, not proof of an actual agreement)
- United States v. Mandel, 647 F.3d 710 (7th Cir.) (discussing §1958 and entrapment issues)
- United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir.) (outlining circumstances that strongly corroborate solicitation intent under §373)
- United States v. Holt, 486 F.3d 997 (7th Cir.) (Rule 608(b) limits and trial-court discretion on cross-examination)
- United States v. Dawson, 434 F.3d 956 (7th Cir.) (permitting lines of questioning about third-party opinions and consequences under Rule 608(b))
- United States v. DeMarco, 784 F.3d 388 (7th Cir.) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary rulings)