996 F.3d 903
8th Cir.2021Background:
- Neighbor reported screaming; deputies entered Dane Arredondo’s home that evening to check on a potentially injured woman.
- Officers found Ashley Richards highly intoxicated but not injured; David (Dane’s brother) was evasive and initially told officers Dane was not present.
- Deputies detained David in the basement; Dane went upstairs to retrieve ID and was escorted by officers.
- While upstairs, Deputy Fenton observed several small clear glass vials on a couch, picked them up, read a label (Ketamine), researched contents on his phone, and ultimately seized the vials; Officer Pond seized a separate vial of Fentanyl in the basement.
- Dane moved to suppress the vials as the fruit of an illegal search; the magistrate and district court concluded the plain-view exception did not apply to the ketamine vials and suppressed them.
- The government appealed; the Eighth Circuit panel affirmed suppression, holding the vials’ incriminating character was not "immediately apparent," although a dissent argued the totality of circumstances supported probable cause.
Issues:
| Issue | Government's Argument | Dane's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plain-view exception justified warrantless seizure of the glass vials | Officers were lawfully present (exigent/community-caretaker/consent) and the vials’ incriminating character was immediately apparent, permitting seizure | Vials were innocuous containers (possible noncontraband) and their incriminating character was not immediately apparent, so seizure required a warrant | Court affirmed suppression: plain-view second prong fails—officers lacked probable cause that vials were contraband when they picked them up |
| Whether officers were lawfully positioned upstairs when they observed the vials | Officers’ presence was justified by exigent/community-caretaker functions and/or implied consent | Any exigency had dissipated and there was no valid consent to be upstairs; entry exceeded scope | Majority declined to resolve definitively (unnecessary to decision); questioned lawfulness but resolved case on plain-view ground; dissent would have found lawful presence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Lewis, 864 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2017) (sets out plain-view elements)
- Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (moving items to read identifiers is a search; plain view requires probable cause)
- United States v. Weinbender, 109 F.3d 1327 (8th Cir. 1997) ("immediately apparent" means probable cause to associate item with criminal activity)
- United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2012) ("immediately apparent" does not require certainty; consider totality of circumstances)
- United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1994) (officers’ hunch is insufficient to justify a warrantless search)
- United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2005) (standard of review for factual findings and legal conclusions)
- United States v. Martin, 869 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1989) (intoxicated behavior plus suspicious container can support plain-view seizure)
- United States v. Craddock, 841 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2016) (probable cause requires a practical, nontechnical probability of incriminating evidence)
- United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237 (8th Cir. 1995) (incriminating nature of materials can be "immediately apparent" given context)