United States v. Cureton, 845 F.3d 322

Defendant Thomas Cureton tied up, choked, beat, and threatened a roommate with a gun, forced her to call family for ransom; police arrested him when he returned with the victim and money.
A jury convicted Cureton of interstate ransom demand (18 U.S.C. § 875(a)), attempted extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), and two counts of using/possessing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
At initial sentencing, § 924(c) convictions produced consecutive terms that raised the aggregate sentence to 744 months; prior appeals resulted in vacatur and remands, and the current sentence is 444 months.
On this appeal Cureton challenges only Count 2: the § 924(c) conviction premised on the § 875(a) ransom-demand offense, arguing § 875(a) is not a "crime of violence."
The court applies plain-error review because Cureton did not raise the § 924(c) challenge in the district court.
The Seventh Circuit affirms, holding that a ransom demand under § 875(a) necessarily includes at least an implied threat of physical force and thus qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 875(a) is a "crime of violence" for § 924(c) purposes	Cureton: § 875(a) does not have threatened physical force as an element; residual clause is void under Johnson	Government: ransom demand necessarily implies a threat of physical force, so it meets the elements clause; residual clause also invalid but elements clause suffices	Affirmed: § 875(a) involves at least an implied threat of force and qualifies under § 924(c)(3)(A)
Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is constitutional	Cureton: Johnson renders the residual clause unconstitutionally vague	Government: (acknowledged) residual clause problematic but not necessary here	Court agrees residual clause is infirm per precedent but upholds conviction under the elements clause
Standard of review / plain error application	Cureton: challenges conviction on appeal without district court objection	Government: plain-error review applies; issue at least debatable	Under plain-error review, defendant fails to show plain, prejudicial error; conviction stands
Prejudice from alleged error (substantial rights)	Cureton: § 924(c) added 84 months, so vacatur would affect his substantial rights	Government: guideline exposure unchanged; district court could lawfully impose same overall sentence; factual violence at sentencing supports same term	Court: defendant cannot show outcome would differ; no substantial-rights prejudice

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (residual-clause vagueness holding relied upon)
United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959 (7th Cir.) (concluding § 924(c) residual clause is indistinguishable from Johnson)
United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir.) (invalidating identical residual language in § 16(b))
Dawkins v. United States, 809 F.3d 953 (7th Cir.) (discussing elements-clause analysis under § 924(c))
United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir.) (plain-error review guidance)
United States v. Brika, 487 F.3d 450 (6th Cir.) (noting § 875(a) convictions can occur without an actual kidnapping)
United States v. Heller, 579 F.2d 990 (6th Cir.) (ransom demand in kidnapping context is extortionate because of threatened harm)
United States v. Lawson, 810 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir.) (substantial-rights inquiry for plain-error review)