United States v. Cravens
719 F. App’x 810
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- On May 3, 2016, Kemp Eugene Cravens entered a bank in Wyoming, displayed a handgun to tellers, and took about $14,000; he later confessed and pled guilty to armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)) and to using/brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
- Count 2 (§ 924(c)) carried a mandatory consecutive seven-year minimum for brandishing a firearm; Cravens moved to dismiss Count 2 arguing armed bank robbery is not a “crime of violence.”
- Cravens’ main legal contention: the categorical approach requires examining the least culpable means criminalized by § 2113, and some means (e.g., poisoning or chemical exposure) involve non-mechanical "chemical" force that, he argued, is not "physical force" under § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The district court denied the motion; Cravens reserved the right to appeal the denial and challenged whether federal armed bank robbery satisfies the § 924(c) elements clause (use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force).
- The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo, applied the categorical approach, and considered whether Castleman’s interpretation of “physical force” requires only that force be exerted by concrete bodies and may be indirect (e.g., poisoning), thus bringing Rodriguez-Enriquez into question.
- The court held that the elements clause’s "use of physical force" includes indirect applications (exposure to hazardous chemicals), so armed bank robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A); affirmed the § 924(c) conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal armed bank robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Cravens: § 2113 can criminalize non-mechanical means (e.g., poisoning); "physical force" requires mechanical impact, so § 2113 does not necessarily have "physical force" as an element | Government: "physical force" includes force exerted indirectly (common-law battery scope); even minimal indirect force qualifies | Held: § 2113 satisfies the elements clause because "physical force" includes indirect application (poisoning/chemical exposure); § 924(c) conviction affirmed |
| Whether Rodriguez-Enriquez controlling (chemical means not "physical force") | Cravens: relies on Rodriguez-Enriquez to exclude chemical force from "physical force" | Government: Castleman overrules Rodriguez-Enriquez on means of imparting force; indirect force counts | Held: Rodriguez-Enriquez is no longer controlling in light of Castleman; indirect force qualifies |
| Whether the categorical approach applies to an instant-offense § 924(c) predicate | Cravens: categorical approach requires looking to least culpable conduct under statute | Government/majority: categorical approach remains appropriate for element inquiry; court used precedent but noted debate | Held: Majority applies categorical approach but concludes even least culpable means (exposure to chemicals) satisfy "physical force"; concurrence urged abandoning categorical approach for § 924(c) instant-offense analysis |
| Whether resort to the risk-of-force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)) or constitutional vagueness post-Johnson II is necessary | Cravens: alternatively argued § 924(c)(3)(B) (risk clause) is unconstitutionally vague per Johnson II | Government: unnecessary because elements clause suffices | Held: Court did not decide risk-clause vagueness because elements clause resolved the case |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause and prompted vagueness arguments)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (held "physical force" includes indirect application—force exerted through concrete bodies—and supports common-law-battery level force)
- United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2008) (held nonconsensual drugging was not "physical force" because it was chemical, requiring mechanical-impact interpretation)
- United States v. Ontiveros, 875 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 2017) (applied Castleman to conclude prior circuits' chemical-exposure holdings were no longer viable)
- United States v. Perez-Vargas, 414 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2005) (previously held exposing someone to hazardous chemicals did not involve "physical force" under certain guidelines)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopted categorical approach for determining whether prior convictions qualify as predicate offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limits inquiry to statutory elements under categorical approach)