United States v. Craig Giboney
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13120
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Craig Giboney pled guilty to transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, while reserving appeal rights on two pretrial rulings.
- FBI undercover agent on GigaTribe downloaded child‑pornography files from user “Jizzlobber11” and traced the associated IP to a St. Charles, Missouri residence where Giboney lived.
- A search warrant was executed at the residence; officers seized a laptop and other media found in the basement where Giboney had been sleeping.
- Detective Jacob Walk conducted an audio‑recorded interview at the house before arrest; he repeatedly told Giboney he was not under arrest and was free to leave.
- After the interview and an encounter outside, officers arrested Giboney and conducted a recorded stationhouse interview in which Giboney ultimately admitted viewing child pornography for about fifteen years.
- The district court denied Giboney’s pro se motion to dismiss the indictment (Commerce Clause challenge) and his motions to suppress pre‑ and post‑arrest statements; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Giboney's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether application of federal child‑pornography statutes exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power | Congress cannot regulate possession of child pornography that did not "physically" cross state lines via the internet | Internet is an instrumentality/channel of interstate commerce; use of internet brings conduct within Commerce Clause | Rejected; internet use places conduct within Congress’s Commerce Clause power; motion to dismiss denied |
| Whether pre‑arrest statements must be suppressed for lack of Miranda warnings (custodial interrogation) | Detective Walk interrogated Giboney at home without Miranda; interview was custodial | Detective Walk repeatedly told Giboney he was not under arrest, Giboney had freedom of movement and voluntarily answered; no restraint to degree of formal arrest | Rejected; totality shows non‑custodial interview, so no Miranda requirement for pre‑arrest statements |
| Whether post‑arrest statements must be suppressed because Giboney invoked right to counsel | Giboney’s on‑the‑record confusion/questions about counsel constituted an invocation of the right to counsel | Giboney’s remarks were ambiguous or joking; he clarified he only wanted counsel if charged and then waived; no clear, unequivocal request for counsel | Rejected; no clear and unequivocal invocation, so questioning valid and post‑arrest statements admissible |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (discussing limits of Commerce Clause)
- United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (Commerce Clause principles)
- United States v. Havlik, 710 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2013) (internet is an instrumentality/channel of interstate commerce)
- United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2007) (conduct using internet falls within Commerce Clause)
- United States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2004) (custody inquiry factors for Miranda in-home questioning)
- Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (standard for custody determination under Miranda)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (clear and unequivocal invocation required to invoke right to counsel)
- United States v. Kelly, 329 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2003) (clarifying invocation standard)
- United States v. Huether, 673 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2012) (Miranda triggers when custodial interrogation occurs)
- United States v. Perrin, 659 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2011) (admonitions that suspect is free to leave weigh strongly against custody)