United States v. Craig Donnelly, 41 F.4th 1102

Craig Donnelly was federally charged with stalking-related offenses and detained pending trial; after a competency hearing the district court found him incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
The IDRA requires the Attorney General to hospitalize a committed defendant "for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months," to determine whether restoration to competency is substantially probable.
The Bureau of Prisons (acting for the Attorney General) lacked available beds, producing a lengthy pre-hospitalization delay; Donnelly remained in pre-hospitalization custody for six to eight months awaiting placement.
Donnelly moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statutory four-month limit began when the court committed him to the Attorney General and that the delay violated the Fifth Amendment; the district court denied the motion.
The Ninth Circuit granted interlocutory review, concluded the delay violated the statute/constitutional limits, vacated, and remanded with instructions to order hospitalization within seven days; it refused to dismiss the indictment now but left dismissal open if the government fails to comply or engages in flagrant misconduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does §4241(d)(1)'s four‑month period begin?	Begins upon the district court's commitment of the defendant to the Attorney General.	Begins only when the Attorney General actually hospitalizes the defendant.	Majority: Text suggests the four‑month limit applies to the hospitalization period, beginning on hospitalization; but pre‑hospitalization delay cannot be unbounded and here the extended delay violated the statute/constitutional limits. Concurrence: four months covers the entire commitment period.
Does the Attorney General's prolonged pre‑hospitalization delay violate due process?	Long, indefinite pre‑hospitalization confinement violates the Fifth Amendment (Jackson v. Indiana).	Delay is harmless because defendant would be detained pending trial regardless; no grossly outrageous conduct.	Court: Jackson forbids indefinite confinement; the lengthy delay here exceeds a Jackson‑compatible limit. The court remedied statutory/constitutional violation but did not find dismissal warranted on due process grounds now.
Appropriate remedy for the statutory/constitutional violation?	Dismiss the indictment.	Dismissal is not required; court should order prompt hospitalization or other tailored relief.	Court: Dismissal is not the appropriate remedy at this time. Ordered hospitalization within seven days; dismissal remains possible later if government fails to comply or conduct is egregious.

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (Fourteenth Amendment forbids indefinite commitment solely for incompetency; duration must bear reasonable relation to purpose)
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (discussed interlocutory review and standards in competency-related proceedings)
United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissal for due process violations requires "grossly shocking and outrageous" government misconduct)
United States v. Quintero, 995 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2021) (Attorney General/BOP has discretion in identifying a suitable facility under §4247)
United States v. Strong, 489 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussion of IDRA procedures and timing)
Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (injunctive relief ordering hospitalization within a set time to remedy lengthy pre‑hospitalization delays)
United States v. Bundy, 968 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2020) (district court supervisory powers and remedial options short of dismissal)
United States v. Romero, 833 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2016) (time while a defendant is incompetent to stand trial may be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act; extended unlawful exclusions constitute real injury)