United States v. Cowan
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6051
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- Informant-based drug trafficking investigation leads to a warrant to search Booth's Davenport apartment and related areas for drugs and occupancy indicia.
- Cowan is present in the apartment during the execution of the warrant; officers frisk him and feel keys in his pocket.
- Detective Canas seizes the keys and later uses a key fob to locate a car, while Cowan provides inconsistent statements about arrival from Chicago.
- A drug dog later alerts to drugs in Cowan's car; drugs are found in the car and in the apartment.
- Miranda rights are administered to Cowan after the apartment search; Cowan makes incriminating statements in response to questions about the car and travel from Chicago.
- District court suppresses the keys, the car cocaine, and certain statements as resulting from Fourth Amendment violations, then suppresses some Miranda-related statements; government appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether seizure of the keys was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. | Cowan argues the pat-down exceeded Terry limits and the keys were not immediately identifiable as incriminating. | Government contends the keys were seized as indicia of occupancy and immediately apparent as evidence. | Seizure of the keys was lawful under the automobile exception/plain feel analysis. |
| Whether pressing the key fob to locate the car was a Fourth Amendment search or seizure justified by probable cause. | Cowan asserts no privacy interest and that any search was improper without consent or warrant. | Government relies on automobile exception and probable cause linking keys to drug trafficking. | Use of the key fob was permissible under the automobile exception given probable cause. |
| Whether Cowan's statements to Detective Canas about arrival and car keys were interrogation and thus subject to Miranda. | Statements were routine identification questions not interrogation. | Questions about keys and bus ride were directly relevant to the crime and thus interrogation. | Unwarned questions about arrival and keys were interrogation; suppression of those responses affirmed. |
| Whether the post-Miranda statements to Sergeant Proehl were admissible as fruit of the earlier unlawful search. | Suppression of the earlier unlawful search should render later statements inadmissible. | Miranda waiver was voluntary and independent of the Fourth Amendment violation. | Statements to Proehl admitted as voluntary and not fruit of the illegal search. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dickerson v. United States, 508 U.S. 366 (U.S. 1993) (plain touch/identity-of-object immediately apparent; limits on extending pat-down searches)
- Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1983) (plain view/appearance and probable cause standards for incriminating nature)
- Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (U.S. 1980) (patron presence not by itself establishing probable cause during a search)
- Pringle v. United States, 540 U.S. 366 (U.S. 2003) (car occupant inference of shared criminal enterprise; applicability to vehicle contexts)
- Romero v. United States, 452 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2006) (hotel room context; scope of probable cause for associated individuals)
- Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276 (U.S. 1983) (reasonable expectation of privacy in automobile; public scrutiny of vehicle)
- Jones v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (U.S. 2012) (GPS tracking; trespass and Fourth Amendment boundaries in modern surveillance)
- Martinez v. United States, 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006) (custody determination; factors for whether questioning occurs in custody)