United States v. Courtland, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 8511

Defendants Courtland, Bacon, and Addison pled guilty to a dog fighting conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 based on 7 U.S.C. § 2156.
A consolidated sentencing hearing followed for seven defendants, with the three appellants appealing their sentences.
The district court prepared a sua sponte sentencing memorandum studying dog fighting history and its harms, placed in the record ahead of the sentencing hearing.
The memorandum described severe abuses in dog fighting and linked the activity to broader crime, but the court stated it did not attribute these issues to the defendants.
At sentencing, the court imposed 3-year supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and individualized prison terms: Courtland 18 months, Bacon 16 months, Addison 24 months.
Addison received an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2E3.1, application note 2, for extraordinary cruelty (electrocuting a defeated dog).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Memorandum and separation of powers	Court contends memorandum did not violate separation of powers.	Court argued memorandum exceeded judiciary’s proper role.	Memorandum did not violate separation of powers.
Extraneous/inflammatory content in memorandum	Figueroa-like inflammatory remarks could undermine fairness.	No improper use of extraneous material; proper consideration of § 3553 factors.	No reversible error; statements did not improperly influence sentence.
Upward departures and justification	Court’s above-guidelines sentence justified by nature and circumstances of offense.	Need clearer explanation for departures from guidelines.	Above-guidelines sentences properly justified under § 3553(a).
Substantive reasonableness	Disparities among co-defendants permissible given leadership roles and extent of conspiracy.	Sentences overly severe or inconsistent with co-conspirators.	Courts’ sentences are substantively reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (separation of powers and executive/administrative duties limits)
In re United States, 345 F.3d 450 (7th Cir.2003) (courts may inform themselves about relevant issues; separation concerns limited)
Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739 (7th Cir.2010) (extraneous, inflammatory remarks at sentencing may require reversal)
Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901 (7th Cir.2009) (sentencing explanations need not be framed as departures from the guidelines)
Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350 (2009) (bar on rigidly binding explanations; § 3553(a) framework governs)
Vaughn, 614 F.3d 412 (7th Cir.2010) (procedural sufficiency in explaining sentences after Bartlett)
Dean, 414 F.3d 725 (7th Cir.2005) (explains variance and § 3553 factors justify departures from guidelines)
Gooden, 564 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.2009) (disparity among co-defendants generally permissible)
Omole, 523 F.3d 691 (7th Cir.2008) (co-defendant disparities not per se invalid)
Amato, 15 F.3d 230 (2d Cir.1994) (joint sentencing considerations within § 3553 framework)
Coe, 220 F.3d 573 (7th Cir.2000) (co-defendant sentencing considerations and rationale)
Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (recognizes judiciary’s role in sentencing; innovation allowed)