United States v. Coss
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7530
| 6th Cir. | 2012Background
- Coss and Sippola devised a plan to extort money from actor John Stamos using fake personas to threaten disclosure of party-night photographs.
- Coss, then 17, and Sippola created the personas “Jessica Taylor” and “Brian L.” to contact Stamos and demand money.
- The emails threatened to sell or disclose the photographs unless Stamos paid $680,000, implying tabloid exposure and reputational harm.
- A FBI investigation followed; Stamos agreed to a purchase arrangement for the photographs, which was to occur outside a Marquette, Michigan location.
- Coss and Sippola were arrested near the scene of the planned exchange, and were indicted on one count of conspiracy to extort and two counts of transmitting threats.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the indictment sufficiently charged § 875(d) | Coss and Sippola argue the indictment should reflect a wrongful-threat requirement. | Coss and Sippola contend the statute is read narrowly to unlawful threats, or that the indictment fails if only wrongful threats are required. | Indictment sufficient; § 875(d) includes a wrongful-threat requirement. |
| Constitutionality of § 875(d) as vague/overbroad | Statute could chill protected speech if overly broad or vague. | Statute is vague/overbroad under First Amendment. | Statute cabined by wrongful-threat and intent to extort requirements; not void for vagueness or overbreadth. |
| Standard and outcome of downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility | N/A | Denial of acceptance of responsibility due to lack of mens rea. | District court's denial affirmed; not clearly erroneous. |
| Scope of ‘intent to extort’ as a specific-intent requirement under § 875(d) | The government argues intent to extort is required and proven by evidence. | Defendants challenged the sufficiency but had argued lack of mens rea. | Court treats ‘intent to extort’ as a specific-intent element, supporting the conviction. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jackson, 180 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (reading § 875(d) to require wrongful (unlawful) threats (unreported pin cites))
- United States v. Cooper, 523 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1975) (recognizes ‘intent to extort’ as a specific-intent requirement)
- United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992) (discusses intent in § 875 contexts)
- United States v. Clements, 144 F.3d 981 (6th Cir. 1998) (extortion-related classification; not a crime of violence under 4B1.2(a)(1))
- United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001) (extortion-style threats and generally understood meaning of extortion)
- United States v. Anderson, 605 F.3d 404 (6th Cir. 2010) (indictment sufficiency and element-based approach)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (First Amendment overbreadth/vagueness standard)
- Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (illustrates vagueness/overbreadth principles in context)