United States v. Cortes-Gomez, 926 F.3d 699

Marco Antonio Cortes-Gomez was indicted in Jan. 2016 on methamphetamine conspiracy charges; trial began Nov. 29, 2016 (329 days after arraignment). Two superseding indictments, addition of codefendants, plea bargains by some codefendants, and continuances occurred during the interim.
The district court excluded two delay periods from the Speedy Trial Act (STA) clock as attributable to codefendants: (1) the period between Cortes-Gomez’s arraignment and the last codefendant’s arraignment (Jan. 21–May 19) and (2) an ends‑of‑justice continuance for a codefendant (July 19–Oct. 11).
Cortes‑Gomez moved repeatedly to sever and repeatedly asserted his speedy‑trial rights; the court denied renewed severance and concluded codefendant delays were reasonable to permit an efficient joint trial.
At trial all four former codefendants testified against Cortes‑Gomez; he requested a specialized accomplice‑testimony instruction which the district court refused, instead giving the Tenth Circuit pattern accomplice cautionary instruction.
At sentencing the court applied a four‑level organizer/leader role enhancement and a two‑level "criminal livelihood" enhancement, producing an advisory Guidelines offense level of 44; the court varied below and imposed concurrent terms of 240 and 294 months.

Issue	Cortes‑Gomez's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Speedy Trial Act exclusion of codefendant delays	Exclusions (Jan–May, July–Oct) were not permissible; STA violation because delays should not run from latest codefendant	Delays were properly excluded under §3161(h)(6) as reasonable and to permit efficient joint trial	Affirmed: district court did not clearly err; exclusions reasonable under codefendant provision
Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim	329‑day delay violated Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial	Delay was under one year for presumptive prejudice threshold given complex conspiracy charges; no further Barker inquiry required	Affirmed: delay not presumptively prejudicial; no constitutional violation
Jury instruction on accomplice testimony	Requested instruction emphasizing accomplice motive to falsify; refusal deprived jury of proper caution	Pattern Tenth Circuit accomplice instruction plus general credibility instruction was sufficient	Affirmed: trial court’s pattern instruction adequately cautioned jury
Sentencing enhancements (organizer/leader; criminal livelihood)	Challenges factual basis—accomplice testimony inconsistent; other employment evidence undermines livelihood finding	Record supports that he recruited/supervised others and that drug proceeds and testimony show criminal conduct as primary livelihood	Affirmed: factual findings supported; district court did not clearly err in applying both enhancements

United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir.) (standard for STA review)
United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312 (10th Cir. 2014) (factors for evaluating reasonableness of codefendant delays)
United States v. Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir.) (purpose of codefendant exclusion to permit joint trials)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor Sixth Amendment speedy trial balancing)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptive prejudice threshold approaches one year)
Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (presumption favoring joint trials when properly joined)
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (deference to permissible factual view)
United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 268 (10th Cir.) (requirement to caution jury about accomplice testimony)