United States v. Cornell Robinson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7251
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- In the pre-dawn hours of March 24, 2014, three masked, armed men (including Robinson and Kelley) approached Precious Crawford and her boyfriend as Crawford went into labor. Robinson pointed a handgun at Crawford and repeatedly threatened her life.
- Robinson and Kelley demanded entry to Crawford’s apartment and money; when Crawford could not open the apartment door, Robinson took her car key and drove off in her car with Kelley.
- Police later found Robinson driving the stolen car, pursued him, and recovered a loaded handgun and a shotgun discarded during the chase; Robinson and Kelley were arrested.
- A federal grand jury charged Robinson with carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119), using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)). A fourth Hobbs Act robbery charge was dropped before trial.
- After a three-day jury trial, Robinson was convicted on all counts and appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence of intent for carjacking, (2) lack of intent at the precise moment he took the keys, (3) that the § 922(g) count was duplicitous, and (4) related challenges to the § 924(c) conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Robinson had intent to cause death or serious bodily harm for § 2119 | Government: pointing a loaded gun, threats (“Do you want to die?”), and conduct support jury inference of requisite intent | Robinson: threats were mere bluster; no evidence he intended to seriously harm Crawford | Affirmed: viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could find intent beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Whether intent existed at the precise moment Robinson took the car keys | Government: threats and gun were contemporaneous with taking keys, so intent linked to taking the car | Robinson: intent must exist at the exact moment of taking; this was an afterthought to robbery | Affirmed: facts permitted jury to find intent at the moment of taking; timing was a factual question for the jury |
| Whether the § 922(g) indictment was duplicitous for alleging possession of two firearms in one count | Government: simultaneous possession of multiple firearms is a single § 922(g) offense and may be charged in one count | Robinson: separate theories (actual vs. constructive possession) constitute separate offenses and risk non-unanimous verdict | Affirmed: simultaneous possession at same time/place is one offense; different means in one count is not duplicitous if elements are unanimous |
| Validity of § 924(c) conviction premised on carjacking | Government: § 924(c) depends on underlying carjacking conviction | Robinson: attacked § 2119 conviction, which would invalidate § 924(c) | Affirmed: because carjacking conviction upheld, § 924(c) conviction stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (intent to cause serious bodily harm must exist at the moment of taking for § 2119)
- United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233 (elements of § 2119 explained)
- United States v. Bailey, 819 F.3d 92 (distinguishing mere intimidation from intent to cause serious harm)
- United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (simultaneous possession of multiple firearms counts as one § 922(g) violation)
- United States v. Goodine, 400 F.3d 202 (simultaneous seizure/time-place key to single § 922(g) violation)
- Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (jury may disagree on means so long as unanimous on elements)