9 F.4th 186
3rd Cir.2021Background
- Corey Grant joined the E‑Port Posse as a juvenile and participated in violent drug‑related crimes, including a 1989 murder and attempted murder; he was tried as an adult and convicted under RICO and related statutes.
- At sentencing in 1992, the then‑mandatory federal Sentencing Guidelines produced a life‑without‑parole (LWOP) sentence on the homicide‑related counts, plus concurrent 40‑year drug sentences and a consecutive 5‑year firearms term (effectively life given no federal parole).
- Miller v. Alabama (2012) held mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) made Miller retroactive, entitling Grant to resentencing.
- At resentencing the district court considered Grant’s youth and mitigating characteristics and imposed 60 years on the RICO/racketeering counts (plus the undisturbed 5‑year consecutive gun term), yielding an aggregate 65‑year term; Grant claimed that term is a de facto LWOP in violation of Miller.
- A prior 3‑judge panel vacated his sentence as presumptively unconstitutional; the en banc Third Circuit reversed: it held Miller requires only discretionary sentencing that considers youth (not particular findings or outcomes), affirmed the 60‑year RICO term, vacated and remanded only to correct an inadvertent increase to a drug count sentence (Count IV), and declined to extend the sentencing‑package doctrine to vacated sentences under these facts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Grant) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a very long term‑of‑years that incarcerates a juvenile until life expectancy can be a de facto LWOP violating Miller | 65 years = de facto LWOP; Miller forbids such a sentence for non‑incorrigible juveniles | Miller guarantees only a discretionary sentencing process that considers youth; a term‑of‑years—even if effectively life—can be imposed after that process | No Miller violation: Grant received the required discretionary consideration of youth; outcome need not be particularized |
| Whether Miller requires on‑the‑record findings (e.g., incorrigibility) or a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” beyond discretionary sentencing | Miller (and Montgomery) require meaningful opportunity for release and practical protections for corrigible juveniles | Miller’s command is procedural: sentencer must have discretion to consider youth; Jones confirms no fixed findings required | Court holds Miller guarantees individualized discretion to consider youth, not mandated findings or outcomes; Jones controls |
| Whether resentencing must be plenary on all counts under the sentencing‑package doctrine when only the LWOP sentence is vacated | The original sentencing was an integrated package; vacatur of LWOP required de novo resentencing on all counts (including drug counts) | Sentencing‑package doctrine historically applies where convictions—not merely sentences—are vacated; district court permissibly limited resentencing here | Argument forfeited below; under plain‑error review the court finds no clear error in limiting resentencing to the homicide counts |
| Whether the district court improperly altered a concurrent drug count sentence at resentencing | N/A (court must correct any inadvertent increase) | N/A | The Third Circuit vacated the inadvertent increase to Count IV and remanded to reinstate the original 40‑year concurrent term |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders violates Eighth Amendment because it forecloses consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (made Miller retroactive on collateral review and explained Miller’s remedial scope)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (Miller requires a discretionary sentencing procedure that permits consideration of youth; no mandatory incorrigibility finding required)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical rule barring LWOP for juvenile non‑homicide offenders and discussion of “meaningful opportunity to obtain release”)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under 18; youth matters in sentencing)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (district courts need only provide brief but adequate sentencing reasons to permit appellate review)