United States v. Corey Grant
887 F.3d 131
| 3rd Cir. | 2018Background
- Corey Grant committed racketeering, RICO conspiracy, drug-trafficking, and a §924(c) gun offense as a juvenile; convictions (1992) included predicate murder and attempted murder.
- Original sentence: mandatory LWOP on RICO/racketeering counts, concurrent 40 years for drug counts, consecutive 5 years for gun count.
- After Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery, District Court granted §2255 relief and resentenced Grant (found non-incorrigible) to 60 years on RICO/racketeering (concurrent with drug counts), producing an effective 65-year term; with good-time credit, release eligibility ~age 72.
- Grant appealed, arguing the 65-year term is a de facto LWOP (life-expectancy confinement) that violates the Eighth Amendment because it denies a meaningful opportunity for release and for post-conviction reform.
- Third Circuit: held de facto LWOP (term-of-years that meets or exceeds offender’s life expectancy) is unconstitutional for non-incorrigible juvenile offenders; vacated sentences on Counts 1 & 2 and remanded for resentencing under a framework requiring individualized life-expectancy findings and consideration of retirement age.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a term-of-years that likely confines a non-incorrigible juvenile for his life ("de facto LWOP") violates the Eighth Amendment | Grant: 65-year term (release at ~72) equals his life expectancy; thus de facto LWOP that denies meaningful opportunity to reform and is unconstitutional under Graham/Miller | Gov: life-expectancy measured from current age is longer (76.7); Grant will live beyond release so sentence affords "some years" outside prison; de facto LWOP permitted so long as not literally LWOP | Held: De facto LWOP that meets or exceeds life expectancy violates the Eighth Amendment for non-incorrigible juvenile offenders (vacated Counts 1&2) |
| What process defines a "meaningful opportunity for release" after Miller/Graham | Grant: release at an age equal to life expectancy is not meaningful; must permit substantial time for reintegration and fulfillment | Gov: "some years" outside prison suffices; courts need not guarantee a meaningful life post-release | Held: "Meaningful opportunity" requires more than token years; courts must aim to permit release at an age that allows societal reintegration and personal fulfillment (presumptively before national retirement age) |
| How to determine whether a term-of-years is constitutionally excessive (measurement standard) | Grant: rely on actuarial life-expectancy data showing confinement to life | Gov: use life tables measured from current age; BOP/geriatric release options also relevant | Held: sentencing courts must hold individualized evidentiary hearings to determine offender-specific life expectancy (considering medical records, expert testimony, actuarial data as relevant), and must consider life expectancy and the national age of retirement as sentencing factors |
| Whether the sentencing-package doctrine required de novo resentencing on all counts | Grant: original sentencing was a cohesive package; vacatur of LWOP portion undermines the whole plan and requires resentencing on all counts | Gov: doctrine applies to vacated convictions, not merely vacated sentences; convictions remain intact so doctrine inapplicable | Held: Issue not preserved below; majority declines to apply doctrine to vacated sentences here and limits relief to vacatur of Counts 1&2 (and correction of inadvertent error on Count 4). A concurrence would have applied the doctrine and ordered full de novo resentencing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles categorically less culpable; death penalty prohibited for crimes committed under 18)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders; must provide meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders unconstitutional; individualized sentencing considering youth required)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule; Miller applies retroactively; distinguishes transient immaturity from irreparable corruption)
- United States v. McKinley, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016) (applied Miller to vacate de facto life sentence expressed as long term-of-years)
- Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (Graham applies to de facto LWOP; aggregate long terms functionally equivalent to LWOP)
- Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2017) (long aggregate term violated Eighth Amendment under Graham)
- United States v. Miknevich, 638 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2011) (plenary review standard for Eighth Amendment sentencing challenges)