629 F.Supp.3d 1149
N.D. Okla.2022Background:
- In 2014 Coombes was convicted in Oklahoma of Second‑degree burglary and grand larceny (both felonies).
- A federal grand jury indicted him in 2022 for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (alleged possession of a Glock .45 and seven rounds).
- Coombes moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (facial and as‑applied challenges).
- The government opposed; the parties briefed and argued the case, including whether historical tradition permits felon disarmament.
- Coombes conceded facts that he burglarized an unoccupied home and stole guitars; he argued his prior convictions were nonviolent and raised equal‑protection and vagueness concerns.
- The court denied the motion to dismiss.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial validity of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen | Government: statute is consistent with historical tradition and longstanding prohibitions on felon firearm possession | Coombes: Bruen’s historical‑tradition test renders § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional on its face | Denied — court found Bruen requires historical support and the government met its burden; § 922(g)(1) is consistent with tradition and Heller/McDonald dicta |
| Whether felons are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment | Government: felons may be excluded from “the people” | Coombes: Heller presumption covers all Americans; felons are not categorically excluded | Court: felons fall within “the people” for analysis; exclusion must be justified historically (not by status alone) |
| Historical tradition for felon‑disarmament | Government: colonial/early‑Republic analogues (attainder, proposals, practices) and later practice support prohibiting firearm possession by felons | Coombes: proposed historical sources are inconclusive or failed; statutes are overbroad | Court: government identified well‑established, representative historical analogues; felon disarmament is consistent with tradition and Heller’s presumptively lawful statement |
| As‑applied challenge for Coombes’ convictions (violent vs nonviolent) | Government: burglary has long been treated as a violent offense and falls within historical justifications for disarmament | Coombes: his convictions were nonviolent; applying § 922(g)(1) to him is improper and vague | Denied — court concluded burglary was historically treated as violent; application to Coombes was consistent with historical understanding |
| Equal protection challenge (strict scrutiny) | Government: Bruen displaced means‑end scrutiny for Second Amendment claims; historical test controls | Coombes: statute discriminates and must satisfy strict scrutiny | Denied — court held separate equal‑protection strict‑scrutiny analysis unnecessary under Bruen and prior precedents upholding § 922(g)(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (adopted historical‑tradition test for Second Amendment review)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to keep and bear arms; described certain prohibitions on felons as presumptively lawful)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated Second Amendment against the states and reiterated Heller dicta)
- Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussed historical inquiry and scope of Second Amendment rights)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (analyzed felons’ Second Amendment claims in light of historical evidence)
- Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (explained constitutional protections for prisoners and limits tied to penological needs)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (treated burglary as a violent felony for sentencing purposes)