United States v. Collins
859 F.3d 1207
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Collins pleaded guilty to distributing >5 grams of cocaine base and was sentenced to prison followed by 4 years supervised release; his prison term was later reduced.
- Collins’s supervised release was revoked once (after positive drug tests), he was imprisoned 18 months and given a new 3‑year supervised‑release term.
- After release he violated supervised release again (drug possession, failed tests, left treatment), admitted violations, and the district court revoked the second term.
- At second revocation the district court sentenced Collins to 12 months’ imprisonment and 2 years’ supervised release, concluding § 3583(e)(3)’s cap was one year based on the offense that produced the first supervised‑release term.
- The government appealed, arguing the statutory cap in § 3583(e)(3) should be measured by the original conviction offense (a Class B felony), which would allow up to three years’ imprisonment on revocation.
- The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the phrase "offense that resulted in such term of supervised release" refers to the original criminal offense of conviction and remanded for resentencing under the Class B felony cap.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the § 3583(e)(3) cap for a second (or subsequent) supervised‑release revocation is measured by the original conviction or by the violative conduct that led to the prior revocation | Collins: the phrase "offense that resulted in the term of supervised release" means the violative conduct (or the revocation) that produced the subsequent supervised‑release term, so the cap is the supervised‑release‑violation’s authorized term | Government: the statute refers to the original criminal offense of conviction that authorized supervised release; thus the cap is set by that conviction (here a Class B felony) | The court held the phrase refers to the original offense of conviction; resentencing must reflect the Class B felony cap (three years) |
| Whether a but‑for causation reading (i.e., "resulted in" = but‑for cause) requires measuring the cap by the earlier revocation | Collins: but for the first revocation he would not have been serving the second term, so the first revocation "resulted in" the second term | Government: Johnson and statutory context require relating revocation penalties to the original offense, not subsequent noncriminal revocations; but‑for causation does not control here | Court rejected Collins’s but‑for causation argument and relied on Johnson to tie penalties to the original conviction |
| Whether § 3583(e)(3)’s cross‑reference to § 3553(a)(1) or the statutory history (including § 3583(h)) supports Collins’s reading | Collins: § 3553(a)(1) and the drafting history (change from "offense for which convicted" to "offense that resulted in") show Congress intended the term to mean the violative conduct producing the revoked term; presence of "original" in § 3583(h) implies different meanings | Government: Title 18 usage of "offense" denotes crimes; canons (consistent meaning, context) and Kellogg require reading "offense" as the conviction offense; § 3583(h)’s "original" clarifies a separate supervisory‑release cap and does not change (e)(3) | Court held the statutory text, context, canons, and Supreme Court precedent require reading "offense" as the original criminal conviction; the drafting history and § 3583(h) do not change that meaning |
| Whether resentencing Collins after he has been released from the revocation imprisonment portion raises double jeopardy or finality problems | Collins: implied concern about altering an already‑served revocation sentence | Government: appealed the district court’s legal error; statutes permit correction | Court: remand and resentencing are permitted; no double jeopardy due to government appeal rights and the illegality of the prior sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (post‑revocation penalties "relate to the original offense")
- Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015) ("offense" in Title 18 commonly denotes crimes)
- United States v. Ford, 798 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2015) ("offense that resulted in the term of supervised release" refers to the initial offense of conviction)
- United States v. Tapia‑Escalera, 356 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 2004) (same — second‑violation context looks back to original conviction)
- United States v. Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607 (10th Cir. 2016) (de novo statutory interpretation standard for § 3583 issues)