United States v. Cline, 986 F.3d 873

Background:

Colorado courts issued two mandatory domestic-violence protection orders against Daniel Cline concerning the same victim, G.H., in two different counties and on different dates.
G.H. later contacted Cline; they traveled together through New Mexico into Texas en route to Mexico/Costa Rica.
Border Patrol stopped their vehicle at a checkpoint after concerned family/friends reported G.H.’s messages; agents observed G.H. injured and crying, and Cline was arrested.
A federal grand jury indicted Cline on two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) — one count per Colorado protection order — and a jury convicted him on both counts.
The PSR recommended a two-level vulnerable-victim enhancement because G.H. was pregnant; the district court adopted it and sentenced Cline to 92 months (bottom of Guidelines range).
Cline appealed, arguing (1) the Colorado mandatory orders fall outside VAWA’s definition of “protection order,” (2) insufficient evidence of interstate intent, (3) counts are multiplicitous (double jeopardy), and (4) the vulnerable-victim enhancement was improper.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Colorado mandatory protection orders qualify as VAWA “protection orders” under 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A)	Gov’t: statutory text covers injunctions/restraining orders; illustrative clause after “including” is not limiting	Cline: VAWA requires orders issued in response to a petition by the protected person; Colorado orders were mandatory and not victim-initiated	Court: Affirmed — VAWA’s definition encompasses mandatory Colorado restraining orders; limiting language applies only to the immediately antecedent clause, not to all antecedents
Whether evidence was insufficient to show interstate travel with intent to violate the orders (judgment of acquittal)	Gov’t: record shows orders in effect, interstate travel, G.H.’s testimony that Cline intended to take her across state lines and to Mexico, and the subsequent violation	Cline: his contact in Colorado already violated the orders; no evidence he specifically intended to further violate them by crossing state lines	Court: Affirmed — viewing evidence in Government’s favor, a rational jury could find intent and subsequent violation beyond a reasonable doubt
Whether two convictions (one per order) are multiplicitous in violation of Double Jeopardy	Gov’t: each order is a distinct unit of prosecution under the statute; Congress treated orders from different jurisdictions separately	Cline: single continuous course of conduct against the same victim should be a single offense	Court: Affirmed — unit of prosecution is a particular protection order (and its portion); two different orders in different jurisdictions supported two counts
Whether the § 3A1.1 vulnerable-victim enhancement was improperly applied	Gov’t: Cline knew G.H. was pregnant and had a history of abuse; she was unusually susceptible	Cline: he did not target or exploit the pregnancy; no showing he used her pregnancy to facilitate the offense	Court: Affirmed — factual finding reviewed for clear error; district court reasonably found G.H. was a vulnerable victim and enhancement was proper

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Arrieta, 862 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2017) (de novo review for statutory interpretation and motion-to-dismiss issues)
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden, 420 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2005) (interpretation of “including” as illustrative/enlarging rather than limiting)
United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995) (multiplicity analysis and deference to statutory unit of prosecution)
United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007) (multiplicity principles and statute-specific unit-of-prosecution analysis)
United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying unit-of-prosecution analysis to determine separate offenses)
United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining that separate statutory violations depend on whether Congress intended separate units of prosecution)
United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2015) (statute’s plain language focused unit of prosecution on targeted individual, supporting multiple convictions)
United States v. Burgos, 137 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 1998) (no requirement that defendant target vulnerability for §3A1.1 enhancement)
United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2013) (vulnerability determination is factual and reviewed for clear error)
United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2011) (district court determinations on complex vulnerability issues entitled to deference)