United States v. Clark
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12381
| 10th Cir. | 2013Background
- Defendant Richard Clark was charged in a 24-count indictment for conspiracy, wire fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering tied to a pump-and-dump scheme.
- Co-defendant George Gordon led the scheme; the court had previously affirmed Gordon’s convictions in a related appeal.
- Evidence showed manipulation of penny-stock shares via backdated/promotional materials, coordinated trading, and subsequent laundering of proceeds.
- A caveat on Clark’s home was placed by the government about 18 months before indictment, later lifted and then lifted again, with contested notice and pretrial effect.
- Clark was tried jointly with Gordon; the district court denied severance and Clark challenged several pretrial and jury issues, including counsel, speedy-trial concerns, and Bruton/Confrontation claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process challenge to caveat | Clark contends caveat violated due process pretrial restraints. | Clark argues Jones requires a post-restraint hearing; lack of notice violated rights. | No reversible error; no plain-error established; waiver/forfeiture applies; no due process violation shown. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence | Sufficiency challenges across conspiracy and substantive counts. | Evidence insufficient on some counts, or fails to prove intent to defraud. | Sufficient evidence supported conspiracy, wire, securities, and money-laundering counts; no reversible error. |
| CJA counsel/complex-case funding | District court should have appointed substitute/additional securities-experienced counsel. | Extra counsel necessary for an adequate defense given complexity and finances. | District court did not abuse discretion; existing counsel adequate; no entitlement to additional counsel under these circumstances. |
| Severance and Bruton/Confrontation | Severance needed to prevent Bruton-like prejudice and allow Gordon to testify; co-defendant statements implicating Clark were problematic. | Severance denied appropriately; Bruton not violated as statements were non-testimonial conspiratorial remarks; joint trial permissible. | District court did not abuse its discretion on severance; Bruton/Confrontation claims rejected. |
| Speedy Trial Act/ends-of-justice continuance | Ends-of-justice continuance under § 3161(h)(7) was inadequate or improperly justified. | Continuance reasonable and within ends-of-justice discretion; trial date later set appropriately. | No Speedy Trial Act violation; continuance adequately justified; no remand or dismissal required. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2013) (provides background and standards for co-defendant statements and intertwined evidence)
- Jones v. United States, 160 F.3d 641 (10th Cir. 1998) (pretrial/post-restraint due process considerations for asset restraints)
- Kaley v. United States, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (conducts a similar inquiry into post-restraint rights and forfeitability)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1968) (confrontation issues with non-testifying codefendant statements)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (limits confrontation rights to testimonial statements and requires unavailability and cross-examination for admissibility)
- Townley v. United States, 472 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2007) (non-testimonial co-conspirator statements fall outside Confrontation Clause)
- Sarracino v. United States, 340 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2003) (Bruton applicability is narrow to highly inculpatory statements)