United States v. Clarence Haines, 803 F.3d 713

Background

DEA investigation of a New Orleans heroin ring led to arrests of Clarence Haines, Raymond Porter, and Jose Iturres‑Bonilla; all were tried and convicted of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute ≥1 kg heroin and (2) using communications facilities to facilitate the conspiracy.
Key evidence: ~100 recorded calls/texts, GPS data, surveillance, trash pulls, large heroin seizures (including 999g in Berry’s car and 405g in a press thrown from Iturres‑Bonilla’s garage), substantial cash, presses, wrapping materials, and witness testimony tying defendants to co‑conspirators.
DEA Agent Demond Lockhart testified both as the case agent and as an expert on “drug code”; much of his interpretation of coded language supported the government’s theory; some interpretations of ordinary words and pronouns were objected to.
Jury found the conspiracy involved one kilogram or more of heroin; district court applied statutory ranges based on that conspiracy‑wide quantity, triggering 20‑year mandatory minimums for Haines and Porter and exposing Iturres‑Bonilla to a life statutory maximum.
On appeal, defendants challenged sufficiency of the evidence, Lockhart’s expert/lay testimony, the use of conspiracy‑wide drug‑quantity findings to set statutory minima/maxima, and several sentencing enhancements and discovery/witness issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of Lockhart as drug‑code expert (Rule 702)	Gov: Lockhart’s extensive experience qualifies him to explain jargon and aid jury.	Defs: He lacked formal training; his dual role risked prejudicing jury and exceeded expertise.	Qualified Lockhart as expert; experience sufficient under Rule 702. Some of his testimony exceeded scope and some lay/expert conflation occurred, but errors were harmless.
Scope of Lockhart’s testimony (expert vs lay vs improper)	Gov: interpretations of coded terms and case‑specific usage were proper; many were grounded in investigation.	Defs: Agent improperly interpreted plain English/pronouns and usurped jury fact‑finding.	Three categories: (1) general drug jargon — permissible expert testimony; (2) case‑specific meanings — admissible as lay opinion but court should have guarded against conflation; (3) interpretations of ordinary words/pronouns — impermissible. Errors harmless.
Sufficiency of evidence for convictions	Gov: recordings, surveillance, physical evidence and co‑conspirator testimony collectively prove conspiracy and §843(b) use.	Defs: Without improper expert testimony evidence is insufficient; Porter contested identification as "T"; Iturres‑Bonilla disputed nexus.	Viewed in light most favorable to verdict, the evidence was sufficient for all convictions.
Use of conspiracy‑wide drug quantity to set statutory minima/maxima	Gov (initially): conspiracy‑wide finding could control sentencing; later DOJ policy favored defendant‑specific findings.	Haines/Porter: statutory mandatory minimums cannot be set by conspiracy‑wide quantity; Alleyne/Apprendi require jury find defendant‑specific quantity. Iturres‑Bonilla: challenged life maximum set by conspiracy quantity.	For mandatory minimums, quantity must be defendant‑specific; Haines’ and Porter’s sentences vacated and remanded for resentencing. Iturres‑Bonilla’s challenge to maximum was unpreserved; reviewed for plain error and rejected.

Key Cases Cited

Akins v. United States, 746 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 2014) (permitting agent testimony decoding drug jargon; distinguishes lay vs expert roles)
Dukagjini v. United States, 326 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003) (cautions about dual role of case agent as expert and four concerns re: prejudice, jury confusion, scope, and impeachment)
Griffith v. United States, 118 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 1997) (expert testimony explaining drug‑trade jargon is permissible)
Ceballos v. United States, 302 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2002) (DEA agents properly qualified to testify as drug‑code experts)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (fact increasing penalty other than prior conviction must be found by jury)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (any fact that increases mandatory minimum is an element that must be submitted to jury)
York v. United States, 572 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 2009) (requires precautions when a witness testifies both as fact witness and expert)
Turner v. United States, 319 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2003) (discusses jury’s burden in proving quantity that increases statutory maximum in conspiracy context)
Grinage v. United States, 390 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 2004) (rejects case agent’s lay interpretations of ordinary language that usurp jury inference)
Freeman v. United States, 730 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (limits lay opinion by agents interpreting ordinary language and warns against ‘‘spoon‑feeding’’ jury)