United States v. Churchill, 4:20-cr-00252

Defendant Steven Churchill, owner and president of LPI Media Group, is indicted for conspiracy to commit illegal remunerations under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for allegedly providing Medicare patient information to co-conspirators who generated fictitious dental-brace prescriptions.
Co-defendants Lydia Henslee and Daniel Stadtman purportedly created the fraudulent prescriptions, which Defendant David Warren and M&M Medical Support billed to Medicare for $3,781,105; Warren allegedly distributed kickbacks, and Churchill allegedly received/refunded portions totaling about $1,223,126.56.
The indictment charges the conspiracy occurred from July 2018 to April 2019 and identifies participants, operative dates, and overt acts supporting the conspiracy theory.
Churchill moved for a bill of particulars seeking (1) the earliest statement/event showing his participation, (2) evidence he acted knowingly and willfully, and (3) evidence he knew prescriptions were fraudulent; the Government opposed as an improper discovery request.
The Government produced extensive discovery; Churchill argued volume made it impracticable to identify the specific evidence supporting the allegations against him.
The Court denied the motion, finding the indictment provided sufficient detail to inform Churchill of the charges and that a bill of particulars is not a vehicle for obtaining the Government’s theory or evidence or for organizing voluminous discovery.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the indictment fails to specify how Churchill willfully and knowingly participated in the conspiracy	Indictment is too general; requests particulars on earliest acts, willfulness, and knowledge of fraud	Indictment and discovery sufficiently identify essential elements, participants, dates, and overt acts	Denied — indictment provides sufficient notice; no bill required
Whether Churchill is entitled to details proving scienter (knowledge/willfulness)	Requests specific evidence showing he knew prescriptions were fraudulent	Govt. need not disclose every evidentiary detail in a bill of particulars	Denied — bill not a vehicle for evidentiary disclosure
Whether a bill can be used to obtain the Government’s theory or detailed evidence	Asks for Government to identify how each discovery document supports charges (theory)	Bill of particulars cannot be used to obtain the Government’s trial theory or full proof	Denied — court rejects using bill as discovery substitute
Whether voluminous/unguided discovery warrants a bill of particulars or an obligation to organize evidence	Argues large, unfiltered discovery makes it impracticable to find relevant material and justifies particulars	Govt. not required to organize or pinpoint relevant materials already produced	Denied — voluminous discovery alone does not entitle defendant to particulars

United States v. Kirkham, [citation="129 F. App'x 61"] (5th Cir.) (voluminous discovery does not require bill of particulars)
United States v. Canter, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977) (purpose of bill is to inform defendant of charges so they can prepare a defense)
United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1991) (bill required only when indictment is so general it fails to apprise defendant of specific acts)
Downing v. United States, 348 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1965) (bill cannot be used to obtain Government's theory or detailed evidence)
United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1980) (granting a bill of particulars is within district court's discretion)
United States v. Hughes, 817 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1987) (denial of bill is reversible only if it causes actual surprise and prejudice)
United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973) (lower particularity standard for conspiracy indictments)
Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908) (conspiracy indictments need not allege with technical precision all elements of the object offense)
United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) (indictment is sufficient if it contains essential elements and fairly informs the defendant)