207 F. Supp. 3d 626
W.D. Va.2016Background
- Felix Adriano Chujoy and Carolyn J. Edlind were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to tamper with a witness (Count 1), witness tampering (Count 2), and obstruction of justice (Count 3) relating to efforts to influence witness Michael Kwiatkowski in a separate prosecution (the "Inca’s Secret" case).
- The government’s case relied primarily on jail calls and a June 3, 2015 letter from Chujoy to Edlind, calls/letters using other inmates’ PINs, and two key dinners: a March 2015 dinner at Edlind’s home and a recorded June 16, 2015 dinner at El Charro with Edlind and Kwiatkowski.
- Evidence included recordings of jail calls where Chujoy asked others to contact Kwiatkowski, texts arranging secret meetings ("phones are bugged"), and the June 16 recorded dinner in which Edlind relayed a message from Chujoy and told Kwiatkowski "not to say anything" or "not to mention" things.
- After conviction, defendants moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 for judgment of acquittal arguing insufficiency of evidence and errors in instructions; the court reviewed the record and reserved decision at trial.
- The court concluded the evidence—viewed in the light most favorable to the government—was sufficient to sustain Counts 1–3, but insufficient to support Edlind’s perjury conviction (Count 4) and the obstruction count based on her grand jury testimony (Count 5); Counts 4 and 5 were vacated and judgment of acquittal entered.
Issues
| Issue | Government (Plaintiff) Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for witness tampering (18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(1)) | June 16 dinner, June 3 letter, jail calls and concealment support corrupt persuasion/misleading conduct to influence Kwiatkowski | Actions were non-coercive, innocuous persuasion or discussion; evidence circumstantial and ambiguous | Denied — evidence sufficient for a reasonable juror to find corrupt persuasion and intent to influence testimony |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy to tamper (18 U.S.C. §1512(k)) | Regular contact, coordinated messages, letter and meetings show agreement and knowing participation | No overt act required, but defendants argue lack of concerted plan and insufficient connection prior to April | Denied — jury could infer agreement and knowing voluntary participation from the June events and communications |
| Sufficiency of evidence for obstruction (18 U.S.C. §1503) based on conduct toward Kwiatkowski | Same factual matrix as tampering shows corrupt attempt to impede due administration of justice; intent may be inferred circumstantially | Defendants argue lack of corrupt intent and that communications were not intended to obstruct | Denied — evidence sufficient to show corrupt intent and natural/foreseeable interference with justice |
| Sufficiency of evidence for perjury and obstruction based on grand jury testimony (Counts 4 and 5) | Grand jury false statements: Edlind denied (inter alia) receiving written communications about speaking to Kwiatkowski and denied being asked to speak on his behalf | Questions were ambiguous or limited in context; some answers literally true or responsive to a narrower referent; government failed to prove knowingly false testimony | Granted — statements (as charged to the jury) were ambiguous, lacking proof of knowing falsity, and one statement’s context was redacted; Counts 4 and 5 vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (Sup. Ct.) (requires "knowingly corrupt" persuasion—mere persuasion not enough)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (Sup. Ct.) (standard for sufficiency: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir.) (substantial-evidence review and cumulative-evidence approach)
- United States v. Davis, 380 F.3d 183 (4th Cir.) (treats non-coercive attempts to persuade a witness to lie as within §1512(b) scope)
- Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (Sup. Ct.) (literal-truth defense: literally true but nonresponsive answers cannot support perjury)
- United States v. Sarwari, 155 F.3d 301 (4th Cir.) (perjury requires knowingly false testimony; addresses literal truth and ambiguity defenses)