United States v. Christopher Wright
776 F.3d 134
3rd Cir.2015Background
- From 2005–2007 Wright (Chief of Staff to a Philly councilmember) received a rent-free apartment, free legal services, and promised realtor commissions from Chawla and Teitelman while performing official acts that benefited World Acquisition.
- A federal grand jury indicted Wright, Chawla, Teitelman, and Hardeep Chawla on multiple counts (honest-services fraud, traditional fraud, conspiracy, bribery); after trial the jury convicted Wright, Chawla, and Teitelman on several counts and acquitted on others.
- On appeal this court vacated certain honest-services convictions (post-Skilling) and remanded for a new trial; the District Court then denied a joint pretrial motion by appellants to (a) preclude the Government from relitigating issues under the Double Jeopardy Clause/collateral estoppel and (b) bar constructive amendment of the indictment.
- Appellants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the denial; they also asked the panel to treat the appeal as a mandamus petition if necessary.
- The Third Circuit dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied mandamus relief, then remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Appellants' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of motion to preclude relitigation via collateral estoppel is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine | Collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) tied to Double Jeopardy makes the denial immediately reviewable because retrial on previously decided issues is effectively unreviewable later | The motion would at most suppress particular evidence; it would not require dismissal of an entire count, so Cohen/Abney do not authorize immediate appeal | No jurisdiction: interlocutory appeal improper because appellants conceded retrial would proceed and denial does not extinguish a charge or bar trial on a count |
| Whether denial of motion to preclude constructive amendment of the indictment is immediately appealable under the Grand Jury Clause | Constructive amendment would deprive appellants of Grand Jury protections and thus their right not to be tried, permitting interlocutory review | Midland Asphalt limits interlocutory review to defects that render the grand jury/indictment fundamentally defective; no such defect alleged here | No jurisdiction: indictment was returned by a properly constituted grand jury; constructive-amendment claim is cognizable on post-trial direct appeal |
| Whether Serafini (and Sanabria) require treating functional "legal groundings" as a count for interlocutory review | Serafini’s broader definition of a "count" supports interlocutory review of partial legal groundings that would be barred by collateral estoppel | Serafini interprets §3731 for Government appeals, not defendants’ rights under §1291/Cohen; it does not expand collateral-order doctrine for defendants | Rejected: Serafini is not controlling for a defendant’s interlocutory rights; §1291/Cohen governs defendants and remains narrow |
| Whether the court should instead grant mandamus relief | Mandamus requested as alternative route because collateral-order jurisdiction lacking | Mandamus is extraordinary and requires clear error, no alternative remedy, and irreparable harm | Denied: appellants failed to show irreparable injury or lack of adequate post-trial appellate relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (announcing the collateral-order doctrine for interlocutory appeals)
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy/issue-preclusion claims can sometimes justify immediate review)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (limits honest-services fraud to bribery and kickbacks)
- Midland Asphalt Co. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989) (Grand Jury Clause permits interlocutory review only for defects that defeat the grand jury/indictment itself)
- Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978) (interpretation of Government appeals statute informing §3731 jurisprudence)
- Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (final-judgment rule normally bars interlocutory appeals in criminal cases)
- Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (restating narrow scope of the collateral-order doctrine)
- United States v. Serafini, 167 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 1999) (interpreting §3731’s scope for Government appeals; court explains limits on applying it to defendants)