United States v. Christopher Strong, Sr.
826 F.3d 1109
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Christopher Strong was tried for aggravated sexual abuse after confining, beating, and raping his girlfriend, Fawnda Parkhurst, over three days (June 6–8, 2014); Parkhurst later was struck by a car and severely injured while fleeing or being forced from the scene.
- Government gave pretrial notice and introduced evidence of Strong’s prior 2009 sexual assault conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 413; the district court severed non-sexual-assault counts to limit spillover and admitted the 2009 evidence at the sexual-abuse trial.
- Strong sought to call an accident-reconstruction expert to testify that physical evidence could not establish whether Parkhurst was pushed in front of the car; the district court excluded the expert at trial.
- A jury convicted Strong of aggravated sexual abuse; the Presentence Report recommended and the district court applied enhancements (abduction + physical restraint), producing a Guidelines range and a 360-month sentence.
- On appeal Strong challenged: (1) admission of the prior sexual-assault evidence under Rule 413/403; (2) exclusion of his expert under Rule 702; and (3) alleged double counting from applying both abduction and physical-restraint enhancements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov.) | Defendant's Argument (Strong) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of prior sexual-assault evidence under Rule 413 | Rule 413 permits admission to show propensity in sexual-assault prosecutions; probative value important to credibility | Admission was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 and risked spillover to other counts | Evidence admissible under Rule 413; district court performed balancing, severed counts to prevent spillover, no abuse of discretion |
| Exclusion of defense accident-reconstruction expert (Rule 702) | Expert irrelevant to aggravated sexual-abuse element; allowing would be unnecessary and potentially impeachment by extrinsic evidence | Expert would show physical evidence cannot prove Parkhurst was pushed, undermining prosecution narrative and corroboration | Exclusion upheld: testimony not helpful to jury on sexual-abuse element and its probative value was minimal; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Sentencing: application of abduction enhancement plus physical-restraint adjustment | Enhancements address different harms and are permissible together under the Guidelines when supported by separate facts | Applying both penalized the same conduct; constitutes impermissible double counting | Court affirmed: abduction and physical-restraint applied to distinct conduct; no impermissible double counting |
| Scope/form of prior-act evidence (dissent) | N/A (dissent faults majority on particular evidence used) | Admission of graphic photos and detailed testimony was overly inflammatory; error not harmless | Majority upheld admission; dissent would vacate and remand for new trial, finding the particular evidence unduly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2005) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1998) (Congressional purpose of Rule 413 and relevance to credibility)
- United States v. Gabe, 237 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2001) (Rule 413 supersedes Rule 404’s character-evidence prohibition as to sexual-assault propensity)
- United States v. Hollow Horn, 523 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2008) (prior rape testimony under Rule 413 was probative though prejudicial)
- United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996) (trial court’s broad discretion to exclude expert testimony)
- Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (warning against unfair prejudice from inflammatory evidence)
- United States v. Hipenbecker, 115 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 1997) (double-counting explained and analyzed)