United States v. Christopher Singletary, 984 F.3d 341

Defendant Christopher Singletary pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
At sentencing (May 15, 2019) the district court orally imposed custody and supervised-release terms but did not orally announce two non-mandatory "financial" conditions.
The written judgment (entered May 29, 2019) nevertheless included two additional non-mandatory conditions: (1) no new credit charges or new lines of credit without probation approval, and (2) provision of requested financial information to probation.
Singletary appealed; the government moved to dismiss under a plea-waiver; the government conceded that the district court failed to explain special conditions and that Rogers error occurred by including conditions first in the written judgment.
The Fourth Circuit held that the Rogers error meant Singletary was never sentenced to those financial conditions, the Rogers claim falls outside his plea waiver, and vacated the entire sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Singletary's Rogers claim is barred by his plea-waiver	Waiver does not cover a claim that certain conditions were never "imposed" because they first appeared only in the written judgment	Waiver bars appeals challenging the sentence, including these conditions	Rogers claim is outside the waiver; waiver covers challenges to an actually imposed sentence, but Rogers claims that the conditions were never imposed
Whether the district court committed a Rogers error by failing to orally pronounce non-mandatory financial conditions	The two financial conditions in the written judgment were not pronounced at sentencing and thus were never part of the sentence	Government concedes Rogers error here	Court found a Rogers error: non-mandatory conditions not announced in open court are nullities
Proper remedy for a Rogers error	Strike the conditions or remand	Government urged limited relief or harmonization on remand	Court vacated the entire sentence and remanded for resentencing (per Rogers)
Whether the credit-condition impermissibly delegates sentencing authority to probation	Condition improperly delegates "nature and extent" of punishment to probation officer	Condition is a permissible ministerial delegation (probation approval merely ministerial)	Court declined to decide; issue is premature because condition was never imposed and remand may change outcome

United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020) (all non-mandatory supervised-release conditions must be announced orally at sentencing)
United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670 (4th Cir. 2020) (district court must explain imposition of special supervised-release conditions)
United States v. Ketter, 908 F.3d 61 (4th Cir. 2018) (custodial and supervised-release terms are components of a unified sentence)
United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (right to be present at sentencing is critical to imposing conditions)
United States v. Under Seal, 853 F.3d 706 (4th Cir. 2017) (courts should avoid issuing advisory opinions)
United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding a probation-approval requirement as a permissible ministerial delegation)