United States v. Christopher R. Ely
705 F. App'x 779
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Christopher Ely pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, served prison time, and later had supervised release revoked.
- At revocation, the district court re-imposed a special "no-contact" condition barring Ely from contacting minors (including his daughter) unless the probation officer approved written permission.
- Ely challenged the condition on appeal, arguing (1) the court should have made an "individualized inquiry" or "particularized showing" before restricting contact with his daughter and (2) requiring probation‑officer approval improperly delegated judicial authority.
- Ely did not clearly raise the individualized‑inquiry or delegation arguments in the district court, so the Eleventh Circuit reviewed those claims for plain error. His more general objection (requesting an exception to contact his daughter) was preserved and reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: no plain error in declining to require an individualized inquiry; the condition was reasonably related to Ely’s offenses and history; and delegating supervisory approval to the probation officer was not an unlawful delegation of judicial power because the court retained ultimate authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ely) | Defendant's Argument (Government/District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether re‑imposing a no‑contact condition without an "individualized inquiry" or "particularized showing" violated law | Ely: Condition required individualized inquiry/particularized showing (especially regarding contact with his daughter) | Dist. Ct./Govt: No controlling authority requires that inquiry; condition is permissible and related to offense/history | No plain error; no such requirement and no abuse of discretion to impose the condition |
| Whether the no‑contact condition conflicts with Sentencing Commission policy statement for sex offenses | Ely: Condition inconsistent with policy (not limited to recommended conditions) | Dist. Ct./Govt: Policy lists recommended conditions but does not preclude additional appropriate conditions | Held: No conflict; condition is consistent with policy and permissible |
| Whether delegating approval of communications to the probation officer unconstitutionally delegated judicial power | Ely: Probation officer approval for contacting minors is an improper delegation of Article III duties | Dist. Ct./Govt: Approval is supervisory/ministerial; court retained ultimate authority and can resolve disputes | No plain error/abuse of discretion; supervisory delegation permissible when court keeps ultimate responsibility |
| Whether the no‑contact condition was an excessive deprivation of liberty | Ely: Condition unduly restricts rights (e.g., to contact daughter) | Dist. Ct./Govt: Condition reasonably related to offense, prior convictions, and past supervision violations; allows contact if probation officer approves | Held: Condition appropriately tailored; not greater than necessary; allowed with probation‑officer permission |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2009) (standard for reviewing supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Lejarde‑Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (no plain error when no controlling precedent resolves issue)
- United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010) (factors for special conditions and their independent weighing)
- United States v. Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2013) (requiring individualized inquiry/particularized showing for probation‑officer approval to contact own child)
- United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2001) (limits on delegating judicial functions to probation officers; probation officers may provide administrative support)
- United States v. Nash, 438 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing permissible supervisory duties from impermissible delegation of ultimate sentencing decisions)