United States v. Christopher Mateen
806 F.3d 857
6th Cir.2015Background
- In 2012 Christopher Mateen pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
- The government sought a statutory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) because Mateen had a 2006 Ohio conviction for gross sexual imposition (Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.05).
- Section 2252(b)(2) increases the mandatory minimum to 10 years for defendants with a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to . . . sexual abuse.”
- The district court applied the categorical approach (Taylor), adopted the ordinary meaning of “sexual abuse,” and concluded Ohio’s gross sexual imposition categorically “relates to” sexual abuse.
- Mateen reserved the right to contest the enhancement and argued (1) § 2907.05 is overbroad and (2) Alleyne/Apprendi required proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that his prior conviction qualified.
- The district court imposed a 130-month sentence; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ohio gross sexual imposition (§ 2907.05) qualifies as a prior conviction "relating to . . . sexual abuse" for § 2252(b)(2) enhancement | Mateen: § 2907.05 is overbroad because Ohio's definition of "sexual contact" ("erogenous zone") can include non-sexual body areas | Government: Every offense under § 2907.05 involves nonconsensual sexual contact for sexual gratification and thus relates to sexual abuse | The statute categorically qualifies; all proscribed conduct involves nonconsensual, sexually motivated contact and therefore "relates to" sexual abuse. |
| Proper definition of the federal generic offense "sexual abuse" for § 2252(b)(2) | Mateen: Use the chapter 109A statutory definition of "sexual abuse" (more specific federal framework) | Government: Use the ordinary/common meaning; § 2252(b)(2) uses broader "relating to" language than chapter 109A | Court: Adopt ordinary meaning (sexual = libidinal intent; abuse = to injure/mistreat); § 2252(b)(2) is expansive. |
| Use of the categorical approach to compare the state statute to the federal generic offense | Mateen: (implicit) Court must compare statutory elements, not facts | Government: Apply Taylor categorical approach and compare elements to ordinary-meaning sexual abuse | Court: Applied categorical approach and concluded § 2907.05's elements fall within the ordinary-meaning definition of sexual abuse. |
| Whether Alleyne/Apprendi requires jury proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction qualifies for enhancement | Mateen: Alleyne/Apprendi require jury finding beyond reasonable doubt for facts that increase mandatory minimum | Government: Prior convictions can be found by judge (preponderance) and are exception to those rules | Court: Alleyne/Apprendi do not require jury proof of prior convictions; judge may find prior-conviction predicate by preponderance; no plain error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (clarifying categorical approach and comparing statutory elements)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (limits on judge-found facts that increase punishment)
- Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (mandatory-minimum facts and jury-trial rights)
- United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.) (prior conviction may be found by judge for § 2252 enhancement)
- United States v. Nagy, 760 F.3d 485 (6th Cir.) (Alleyne does not require jury proof of prior convictions)
- United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667 (8th Cir.) (defining "sexual" by ordinary meaning)
- United States v. Sinerius, 504 F.3d 737 (9th Cir.) (broad reading of § 2252(b)(2)'s "relating to")
- United States v. Barker, 723 F.3d 315 (2d Cir.) (interpreting broader "relating to" language)
- United States v. Colson, 683 F.3d 507 (4th Cir.) (similar broad construction of qualifying state offenses)