United States v. Christopher Bradshaw, 955 F.3d 699

Background

In April 2017 a confidential informant bought methamphetamine from Antonio Foster, who arrived as a passenger in a red four‑door Volkswagen registered to Bradshaw’s girlfriend.
Police later found the Volkswagen at Michael Millard’s home; when officers approached, the car fled into a pasture, ran over a fence, and two occupants fled on foot. Bradshaw (the driver) and Foster were apprehended.
Officers recovered $5,285 on Foster, $97 in the vehicle, and a black sock thrown during the chase that contained ~89.15 grams of methamphetamine.
Bradshaw was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute. He was represented by CJA‑appointed counsel but retained private counsel who entered an appearance less than a week before trial and sought a 90‑day continuance/substitution.
The district court denied the last‑minute continuance/substitution request (but allowed retained counsel to assist appointed counsel), the case proceeded to jury trial, and Bradshaw was convicted on both counts.
On appeal Bradshaw challenged (1) the denial of the continuance/substitution as a Sixth Amendment violation and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether denying a last‑minute continuance to substitute counsel violated Bradshaw’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice	Denial prevented substitution of retained counsel who entered days before trial, violating the right to chosen counsel	Court had broad discretion to deny a late substitution; appointed counsel had prepared for months; retained counsel could assist; prior continuances and docket management weigh against further delay	Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion. Late request, no compelling justification, and court acted within discretion (allowed retained counsel to assist)
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine	Testimony was unreliable and speculative; insufficient to show Bradshaw knowingly joined a conspiracy	Evidence tied Bradshaw to the red VW, flight from police, large cash, drugs recovered nearby, eyewitness and informant testimony showing ongoing drug activity	Court affirmed: viewed in light most favorable to verdict, a rational jury could find Bradshaw knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support possession with intent to distribute	No proof Bradshaw ever exercised possession; drugs were found in a sock near Foster	Government proved aiding‑and‑abetting: association with Foster, flight, large cash, informant testimony about Bradshaw’s later transfers; alternative constructive possession theory available	Court affirmed: sufficient evidence to convict under an aiding‑and‑abetting theory (did not decide constructive possession)

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Jones, 662 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2011) (framework for reviewing last‑minute substitution/continuance requests)
United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2009) (factors for evaluating continuance/substitution motions)
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (denial of continuance violates Sixth Amendment only when arbitrary insistence on expeditiousness denies fair representation)
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (standard regarding insistence on expeditiousness vs. justifiable delay)
United States v. Morales, 813 F.3d 1058 (8th Cir. 2016) (elements of conspiracy and standard for knowledge/participation)
United States v. Petroske, 928 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
United States v. Parker, 871 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2017) (de novo review of sufficiency claims)
United States v. Johnson, 470 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 2006) (flight and large sums support inferences of consciousness of guilt and distribution intent)
United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2005) (elements for aiding and abetting)
United States v. McKnight, 799 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1986) (aiding and abetting liability under section 2)