654 F. App'x 984
11th Cir.2016Background
- Defendant Charlie Stevens pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base; sentenced to 160 months. Appeal followed challenging plea voluntariness and a career-offender enhancement.
- Stevens did not object in district court to the adequacy of the Rule 11 plea colloquy or to use of his 2003 Georgia marijuana conviction at sentencing; appellate review was for plain error.
- At the plea hearing, Stevens’s counsel recommended pleading guilty but told Stevens the decision was his; the prosecutor’s plea-deadline remark was noted. Stevens stated he was not coerced and acknowledged rights waived and potential penalties.
- Presentence investigation report (PSI) reflected Stevens’s 2003 Georgia felony conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Georgia statute lists possession and possession-with-intent disjunctively.
- The district court applied the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), treating the 2003 conviction as a qualifying “controlled substance offense.”
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no plain error on either the Rule 11 plea voluntariness or the Guidelines career-offender issue.
Issues
| Issue | Stevens’s Argument | Government’s/Respondent’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea was knowing and voluntary under Rule 11 | Counsel’s pressure and government’s plea deadline coerced plea; counsel’s failure to move to suppress rendered plea involuntary | Plea colloquy showed choice, counsel repeatedly said final decision was Stevens’s, deadline was not coercive, and rights/consequences were explained | Affirmed — no plain error: plea was knowing and voluntary |
| Whether Plea rendered involuntary by ineffective assistance (failure to move to suppress) | Counsel’s purported ineffectiveness made plea involuntary | Ineffective-assistance claim is more properly raised on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not on direct appeal | Not addressed on merits; evidence for § 2255 remedy recommended |
| Whether 2003 Georgia conviction qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) for career-offender | The Georgia conviction should not qualify (argued by implication) | PSI shows conviction was for possession with intent to distribute; Georgia statute is divisible; federal definition controls | Affirmed — no plain error: conviction qualifies and career-offender enhancement proper |
| Proper application of modified categorical approach to Georgia statute | The statute’s disjunctive phrasing requires examining records to identify which offense was convicted | PSI undisputedly shows conviction for possession with intent to distribute; thus modified categorical approach permits use of PSI facts | Affirmed — modified categorical approach supports qualifying offense determination |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir.) (plain-error review when no Rule 11 objection raised)
- United States v. Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2000) (three core Rule 11 concerns for plea voluntariness)
- United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469 (11th Cir. 1988) (attorney recommendation to plead guilty is not coercion)
- United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994) (presumption of truth for plea colloquy statements)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.) (using PSI undisputed facts under modified categorical approach)
- United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816 (11th Cir.) (consideration of PSI facts in modified categorical analysis)