United States v. Charles Wright, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1685

Background

Charles Wright was indicted for distributing and possessing child pornography; convicted and sentenced to 240 months imprisonment and lifetime supervised release; he appealed conviction and sentence.
Law enforcement executed a dawn search warrant at Wright’s home after an IP-address investigation; many armed officers participated; occupants (including Wright) were in sleepwear.
Officer Barnes escorted Wright to a patrol car ~30 feet from the house, told him multiple times he was not under arrest and was free to leave, read Miranda warnings, and conducted a recorded ~62-minute interview in which Wright made numerous inculpatory statements (including use of FrostWire, searching with “PTHC,” and admitting he deleted child images because they were illegal).
During the interview Wright twice expressed he should talk to a lawyer when questioned about ages searched; officers did not cease the interview or obtain counsel.
Wright sought suppression of statements (claiming he invoked counsel), objected at trial under Doyle to prosecutor’s comment on his non-responsiveness about ages, and argued at sentencing that the court denied his counsel a meaningful opportunity to allocute.
The district court denied suppression, overruled the Doyle objection, and allowed defense counsel an initial allocution but refused a post-government rebuttal; the Fifth Circuit affirmed on all three issues.

Issues

Issue	Wright's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Admissibility of interview statements: Was Wright "in custody" for Miranda/was his reference to counsel an invocation requiring cessation?	Wright contends his references to counsel were an unambiguous invocation and the interview was custodial, so statements should be suppressed.	The government argues the encounter was noncustodial (officer assurances, no restraints during interview, public location) and Wright did not unambiguously request counsel.	Court affirmed denial of suppression: objective totality of circumstances show noncustodial interview, so Miranda/Edwards protections not triggered; therefore suppression not required.
Doyle v. Ohio claim: Did prosecutor improperly comment on Wright’s post‑Miranda silence to impeach his defense?	Wright argues prosecutor’s remark (that he “won’t tell Officer Barnes what ages he uses”) improperly drew meaning from silence after Miranda, violating Doyle.	Government contends the comment referenced Wright’s volunteered admission ("I don't want to get in trouble") and photo evidence, not pure post‑Miranda silence, and any error was harmless.	Court assumed arguendo possible Doyle problem but held any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the evidence of knowledge, prior admissions in the recording, and limited/isolated nature of the comment.
Rule 32 allocution: Did the court deny a meaningful opportunity to allocute by preventing defense counsel from replying after government sentencing argument?	Wright contends counsel was denied a meaningful right to respond to government’s new assertions at sentencing, violating Rule 32(i)(4)(A).	Government notes defense counsel had an uninterrupted initial allocution without time/subject limits and the government’s points were contained in the PSR (not new).	Court held no violation: defense counsel had a meaningful opportunity to speak (spoke voluntarily for several minutes without limitation); Rule 32 satisfied.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings to protect Fifth Amendment privilege)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (after an invocation of counsel, police must cease interrogation until counsel is present)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (prosecutorial use of post‑Miranda silence to impeach violates Due Process)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (requests for counsel must be unambiguous to trigger Edwards prophylaxis)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless‑error framework applied to constitutional trial errors)