52 F.4th 546
3rd Cir.2022Background
- Charles Weiss failed to pay federal income taxes for 1986–1991; the IRS assessed $299,202 in October 1994 and the ten‑year collection period began.
- Bankruptcy filings tolled the limitations period multiple times; after tolling the collection statute would expire July 21, 2009 (as previously extended by tolling events noted in the record).
- In Feb 2009 the IRS sent a Notice of Intent to Levy; Weiss timely requested a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, which suspended the running of the limitations period under 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1). At that time at least 129 days remained.
- Weiss lost at the CDP hearing, lost in the Tax Court (147 T.C. 179 (2016)), and lost in the D.C. Circuit, which issued its mandate on August 23, 2018.
- Weiss then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari (filed Oct 24, 2018); the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Dec 3, 2018. The government filed this collection action on Feb 5, 2019.
- The central legal question was whether the § 6330(e)(1) tolling period covers (1) the time between the appellate mandate and a cert petition and (2) the time while a cert petition is pending, making the government’s suit timely.
Issues
| Issue | Weiss's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “appeals therein” in § 6330(e)(1) includes a Supreme Court certiorari petition | “Appeals therein” refers only to administrative or court appeals (not cert petitions); cert is distinct from an appeal | “Appeals therein” is broad and includes petitions seeking further review (including certiorari) | The phrase includes appeals and petitions seeking review of a CDP determination, including cert petitions |
| What “pending” means for tolling under § 6330(e)(1) — intermittent vs. continuous tolling | Tolling ends when a particular hearing or appeal is decided; gaps between proceedings are not tolled | “Pending” covers the continuous period in which further review remains possible; tolling continues until the time to seek further review expires | “Pending” means continuous from commencement until the point no further challenge can be filed; tolling includes the interval between mandate and cert filing and the pendency of the cert petition |
| Whether the government’s February 5, 2019 collection suit was timely | The government filed too late because tolling stopped earlier | Tolling continued through certiorari process so the suit was within the tolled limitations period | The action is timely because the 102 days associated with the cert petition tolled the statute and the suit was filed within the remaining tolled window |
Key Cases Cited
- Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1979) (use ordinary meaning for undefined statutory terms)
- Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1947) (words in revenue statutes take ordinary meanings)
- Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (U.S. 1979) (canon against rendering statutory language superfluous)
- Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (U.S. 2018) (use of contemporaneous dictionaries to interpret undefined statutory terms)
- Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2019) (de novo review of summary judgment in tax collection context)
- United States v. Jabateh, 974 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2020) (referencing dictionary usage for statutory meaning)
- Weiss v. Commissioner, 147 T.C. 179 (T.C. 2016) (Tax Court decision affirming CDP hearing determination)
