United States v. Charles Smoot, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 16860

Smoot, a convicted felon, was found in possession of a loaded .38 revolver in the backyard of 4404 Oliver Street, Hyattsville, Maryland, when police executed an arrest warrant.
The revolver had traveled in interstate commerce (manufactured in Massachusetts, shipped to Maryland in 1975).
Smoot was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and indicted with possession of a firearm as a felon; the government moved in limine to bar constitutional defenses.
Smoot argued that Heller recognized an individual right to possess a firearm in the home and that § 922(g)(1) should require an element beyond mere possession to defeat the right.
The district court instructed the jury on the interstate commerce nexus, indicating it could infer commerce from manufacture in another state but was not required to do so, and Smoot did not testify or present evidence at trial.
Smoot challenged the sentence, arguing he should have received a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which the district court denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to Smoot.	Smoot argues Heller requires an additional defense-specific element.	United States contends § 922(g)(1) is a presumptively lawful restriction.	No; as-applied challenge fails under Chester/Moore; statute presumptively lawful.
Whether the interstate commerce nexus instruction was incorrect or improperly limited.	Smoot contends instruction was incomplete and prevented trial evidence.	Government argues instruction fairly stated law and preserved jury's role.	Instruction was a correct statement of law and did not invade jury's province.
Whether the district court erred in denying acceptance of responsibility for sentencing.	Smoot says he contested a legal element and should still get the credit.	Government and court found Smoot contested factual guilt by challenging the element.	No; Smoot contested an essential element, so no acceptance of responsibility reduction.
Whether the evidence and jury instruction improperly directed a verdict on the commerce element.	Smoot argued Gaudin 변ience; evidence should have been open to challenge.	Instruction left the question to the jury and did not direct verdict.	Direction to the jury preserved the proper evaluation of the element.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (U.S. 2008) (established individual right and acknowledged presumptively lawful restrictions on felons)
United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2001) (4th Cir. 2001) (interstate commerce nexus may be shown by manufacture outside state)
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) (4th Cir. 2010) (two-prong test for Second Amendment challenge to presumptively lawful measures)
United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2012) (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizes potential limits on presumptively lawful measures under as-applied challenges)
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (U.S. 1977) (minimal nexus requirement for interstate commerce element)
Gaudin v. United States, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (U.S. 1995) (jury determination of factual elements cannot be supplanted by judge)
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (U.S. 2000) (challenge to factual guilt can negate acceptance-of-responsibility analysis)
Parkes v. United States, 497 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2007) (2d Cir. 2007) (distinguishes appropriate limits on jury instruction vs. invading jury’s province)