United States v. Charles Carson
32 F.4th 615
| 6th Cir. | 2022Background
- Charles Carson, a member of a gang charged in an RICO conspiracy and related murder count, pled guilty to Count I (racketeering conspiracy) under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea stipulating a 360‑month (30‑year) sentence to run concurrent with an undischarged state term.
- Before Carson’s change of plea, the government filed a notice that it would not seek the death penalty; defense counsel Sanderson met with Carson twice after that filing.
- At the plea hearing the magistrate conducted a full colloquy: Carson confirmed he understood the 360‑month term, that the plea agreement’s terms were understood, and that no promises beyond the agreement had induced his plea; the magistrate found the plea knowing and voluntary.
- Months later Carson moved to withdraw, alleging for the first time that Sanderson told him the 30‑year stipulation would result in actual incarceration of 17 years and that he would face the death penalty if he did not plead guilty.
- After hearings (including an evidentiary hearing), the district court found the record equivocal on the 17‑year allegation, credited Sanderson that he told Carson the government was not seeking death, and denied withdrawal; the court imposed the 360‑month sentence.
- The Sixth Circuit addressed ineffective‑assistance claims on direct appeal (record sufficiently developed), rejected both the sentence‑length and death‑penalty IAC claims, and affirmed denial of the motion to withdraw the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Carson) | Defendant's Argument (United States / District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was ineffective by promising a 30‑year stipulation would result in only ~17 years served | Sanderson told Carson he would actually serve about 17 years and that belief induced the plea | Plea colloquy correctly informed Carson of the 360‑month term and concurrency; record does not show counsel guaranteed 17 years | Rejected: no deficient performance shown; in any event precise, accurate plea colloquy defeats prejudice for guilty‑plea IAC claim |
| Whether counsel was ineffective by threatening or failing to dispel a death‑penalty risk if Carson did not plead | Carson says counsel told him he would face death if he did not plead, so he pled to avoid it | Government filed notice it would not seek death before the plea; Sanderson testified he told Carson the government was not seeking death | Rejected: district court credited Sanderson; no deficient performance demonstrated |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying withdrawal of plea under Rule 11(d)(2)(B) | Withdrawal warranted because plea induced by counsel’s misadvice and coercion about sentence and death risk | Factors under Goddard weigh against withdrawal: delay, late assertion, knowing plea, Carson’s background/experience, and government prejudice | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; all seven Goddard factors weigh against withdrawal |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑part ineffective assistance standard)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice standard for guilty‑plea IAC requires reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial)
- Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560 (6th Cir.) (proper plea colloquy can cure attorney mispromises about sentencing)
- Wynn v. United States, 663 F.3d 847 (6th Cir.) (direct review of IAC permissible where district court held evidentiary hearing and record developed)
- Fortson v. United States, 194 F.3d 730 (6th Cir.) (exception for addressing IAC on direct appeal when record is developed)
- Goddard v. United States, 638 F.3d 490 (6th Cir.) (factors for Rule 11(d)(2)(B) withdrawal motions)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (performance measured against objective professional norms)