United States v. Charles Bunnell, II
697 F. App'x 574
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Charles Bunnell was convicted of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and 1594(c).
- On appeal, the panel assumed (without deciding) Bunnell did not waive his right to challenge his conviction and proceeded to the merits.
- Bunnell argued the Government engaged in outrageous conduct and that several supervised-release conditions were illegal or unconstitutionally vague.
- The court rejected the outrageous-conduct claim and found most challenged supervised-release conditions appropriate and not vague under plain-error review.
- The court found plain error in one condition ordering Bunnell to “support [his] dependents and meet other family responsibilities,” because he has no dependents and the condition was not reasonably related to the offense or his history; that condition was reversed.
- The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to conform the written judgment to the oral sentence and to allow clarification/modification of certain conditions (including travel-limitation language); the government conceded Bunnell cannot be compelled to undergo plethysmographic testing or inpatient treatment on this record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appeal waiver bars review | Bunnell contended he could challenge his conviction/sentence | Government relied on waiver | Court assumed without deciding that waiver did not bar review and proceeded on the merits |
| Whether government engaged in outrageous conduct | Bunnell argued conduct warranted reversal | Government argued conduct permissible | Court rejected outrageous-conduct claim |
| Legality/vagueness of sex-offender treatment condition | Bunnell argued condition was vague because it left broad discretion to probation officer | Government argued condition reasonably related to offense and defendant's characteristics | Condition upheld as not unconstitutionally vague |
| Legality of "support dependents" condition | Bunnell argued he has no dependents and condition unrelated to offense | Government defended condition as standard supervision term | Court found plain error, reversed that condition |
| Whether judgment permits forced plethysmography or inpatient treatment | Bunnell argued judgment could be read to allow forced testing/treatment | Government agreed it could not force such treatments on this record | Court treated such coercion as speculative and said the record does not permit forcing these treatments; judgment need not preclude all hypothetical future treatments |
| Need to conform written judgment to oral pronouncement | Bunnell pointed out discrepancies between written judgment and oral sentence (two conditions) | Government agreed correction/remand appropriate | Court remanded to conform written judgment to oral pronouncement |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947 (9th Cir.) (appeal-waiver enforceability and plea agreement effect not jurisdictional)
- United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (defendant may challenge supervised-release condition as illegal despite appeal waiver; standard for plain-error review)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (addressed vagueness of Guidelines; court noted no need here to resolve Beckles implications because conditions were not vague)