United States v. Charles Andrew Fowler
749 F.3d 1010
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Fowler and accomplices planned a bank robbery in a Florida cemetery; when a patrol officer approached the stolen car, Fowler wrestled away the officer’s gun and shot him dead. Fowler was later identified by a co-conspirator.
- Indicted on two federal counts: (1) witness-tampering murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (Count 1) and (2) using a firearm in a federal crime of violence including murder under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 924(j) (Count 2).
- At initial sentencing the district court imposed life on Count 1 and the mandatory consecutive 10-year term on Count 2 (no guideline objections). The PSR had calculated a life guideline range for Count 1 and ten years for Count 2 (consecutive).
- The Supreme Court reversed Fowler’s witness-tampering conviction (Count 1) and remanded for evaluation under a “reasonable likelihood” standard; the district court on remand found Count 1 insufficient and vacated it and its life sentence.
- The district court then vacated the original 10-year sentence on Count 2 and resentenced Fowler to life on the surviving Count 2, explaining the original sentencing had been a package and that the guidelines and § 3553(a) supported life on Count 2.
- Fowler appealed, arguing the court lacked authority to resentence Count 2 (sentencing package/interdependence), and alternatively that a life sentence on resentencing violated due process by creating a presumption of judicial vindictiveness.
Issues
| Issue | Fowler’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to resentence surviving count after vacatur of another count | District court lacked authority under the "sentencing package" doctrine because Count 2 was not interdependent or grouped with Count 1 | District court may reconstruct the sentencing package; original sentence was a package and mandatory consecutive terms are inherently interdependent | Court affirmed: district court had authority to resentence Count 2 as package had been unbundled |
| Whether resentencing increased total punishment triggering Pearce presumption | Increasing Count 2 from 10 years to life is a more severe sentence invoking Pearce presumption | Aggregate-package view: compare total original sentence (life+10) to new total (life); total did not increase so Pearce not implicated | Court held Pearce not implicated under aggregate-package approach; total aggregate sentence decreased |
| Applicability of Monaco’s aggregate-remainder test in guidelines era | Monaco’s aggregate-remainder approach controls; comparing only surviving-count remainder shows an increase and triggers presumption | Monaco was pre-guidelines; under guidelines era the aggregate-package approach applies and Monaco should not be extended | Court declined to extend Monaco; adopted aggregate-package approach for guidelines-era resentencings |
| Whether increased sentence is presumptively vindictive (even if presumption arose) | Increase indicates vindictiveness absent record reasons | District court stated non-vindictive reasons: original package intent, guidelines calculation, § 3553(a) factors (brutality, criminal history) | Court held reasons affirmatively appear; no presumption of vindictiveness and sentence upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (establishes presumption against vindictive resentencing and need for objective reasons for increases)
- United States v. Monaco, 702 F.2d 860 (11th Cir. 1983) (pre-guidelines aggregate-remainder method for comparing old and new sentences)
- United States v. Mixon, 115 F.3d 900 (11th Cir. 1997) (discusses sentencing package concept and resentencing authority)
- United States v. Martinez, 606 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2010) (treats multi-count sentencing as holistic package subject to revisiting)
- United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (remanding for resentencing when package is disrupted)
- United States v. Watkins, 147 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-guidelines practice comparing aggregate sentences)
- Campbell v. United States, 106 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1997) (supports aggregate-package approach)
- Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013) (guidelines range is the initial benchmark; courts must calculate and consider it in resentencing)