633 F.Supp.3d 874
W.D. Tex.2022Background
- Defendant Raymond Charles Jr. was stopped by police; officers found a loaded Ruger P90 .45 in his vehicle and discovered prior felony convictions (residential burglary; possession with intent to distribute). He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds shortly before trial; the government opposed. The district court had recently decided related Bruen-era § 922(g) challenges in Quiroz and Collette.
- The court applied the Supreme Court’s Bruen framework: (1) ask whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the conduct, and if so (2) ask whether the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
- The court concluded the Second Amendment’s plain text covers firearm possession (following Heller) so the decisive inquiry was the historical-analogue step.
- After tracing federal statutory history (FFA 1938; amendments in 1961; Gun Control Act of 1968; codification at § 922(g)), and relying on historical analogies (e.g., longstanding exclusions from rights of “the people” such as voting and limited First Amendment exclusions), the court found a historical tradition sufficient to uphold categorical felon-disarmament.
- The court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, holding § 922(g)(1) constitutional on its face and as applied to Defendant.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) is facially or as-applied unconstitutional under the Second Amendment | Government: §922(g)(1) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of excluding dangerous persons from firearm rights and is therefore constitutional | Charles: §922(g)(1) is facially and as-applied unconstitutional under Bruen because historical tradition does not support categorical felon bans | Denied — court upheld §922(g)(1) both facially and as-applied |
| Whether "possess" falls within the Second Amendment's plain text | Government: the Amendment’s text covers possession (per Heller), so government must meet historical-analogue burden | Charles: does not effectively dispute that possession is text-covered but contends history fails Bruen’s test | Held: possession is covered by plain text; proceed to historical inquiry |
| Whether historical tradition supports categorical disarmament of felons | Government: historical sources, statutory evolution, and analogies to categorical exclusions from other constitutional "people" rights (e.g., voting) supply the requisite tradition | Charles: historical record lacks direct founding-era analogues of categorical felon-disarmament; Bruen requires close analogues | Held: court accepts analogical reasoning to other constitutional exclusions and statutory history and finds a sufficient tradition to uphold §922(g)(1) |
| Proper scope of Bruen's historical-analogue inquiry (strict mechanical test vs. broader analogizing) | Government: Bruen permits analogical reasoning and comparison to other rights’ historical treatment; Bruen is not an inflexible straitjacket | Charles: Bruen requires narrowly parallel historical analogues specific to felons + firearms | Held: Bruen is not rigidly inflexible; analogies to other constitutional provisions and a commonsense historical inquiry are permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (recognizing an individual right to possess firearms in the home)
- N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (establishing the historical-analogue test for Second Amendment challenges)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (incorporating the Second Amendment against the states)
- United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (defining "the people" as part of the national community)
- Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (dissent highlighted lack of founding-era evidence for categorical felon bans)
- United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) (Second Amendment does not extend to undocumented immigrants)
- De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (First Amendment assembly protections and their limitations)
- Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (limits on advocacy that incites imminent lawless action)