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United States v. Chad Lamar Hogan
684 F. App'x 904
| 11th Cir. | 2017
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Background

  • In June 2013 MPD issued a BOLO identifying Chad Hogan (based on a neighbor’s note of a vehicle license plate) and stating he should be considered armed and dangerous while investigating armed-home-invasion robberies.
  • Corporal Pearson observed a white Ford Expedition registered to Hogan, stopped the vehicle to identify the driver, and the driver identified himself as Hogan.
  • During the stop Pearson asked about weapons; Hogan said there was a gun in the car. Pearson handcuffed Hogan, performed a pat-down, and detained him pending backup and further investigation.
  • Detective Schnupp, who created the BOLO and knew Hogan’s felony record, instructed that Hogan should be arrested if he lacked a firearm permit after being told a gun was in the vehicle.
  • Hogan was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm; he moved to suppress the seized items and his statements as products of an unlawful arrest and custodial interrogation.
  • The magistrate and district courts denied suppression, concluding the stop was a permissible investigatory (Terry) stop, safety measures (pat-down and handcuffing) were reasonable, Hogan was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he admitted the gun, and probable cause arose to search the car and arrest him once officers knew of the gun and his felony status.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether the initial stop and subsequent restraints were an unlawful arrest without probable cause Hogan: the stop and handcuffing were a de facto arrest lacking probable cause Government: BOLO gave reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop; safety measures were justified and did not convert the stop into an arrest Stop was a lawful Terry stop; handcuffing and pat-down were reasonable safety measures and did not automatically transform the stop into an arrest
Whether statements (admission of a gun) were obtained during custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings Hogan: he was in custody and entitled to Miranda before questioning Government: Hogan was not in custody during the pat-down/stop, so Miranda did not apply Court: Hogan was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he admitted the gun
Whether officers had probable cause to arrest and search the vehicle Hogan: no probable cause existed at the time of the stop Government: once officers learned of a gun in the car and knew Hogan was a felon, probable cause existed to arrest and search Probable cause existed to search the car and arrest Hogan once officers had collective knowledge of the gun and his felony status
Whether evidence seized should be suppressed as fruit of unconstitutional seizure Hogan: evidence and statements are tainted by illegal arrest/interrogation Government: seizure and statements were lawful under Terry and probable-cause principles Suppression denied; evidence admissible

Key Cases Cited

  • United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir.) (standards for reviewing denial of suppression)
  • Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruit of the poisonous tree and suppression principle)
  • Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (warrantless public-arrest probable-cause rule)
  • United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (probable cause to search automobile)
  • United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir.) (probable cause standard for arrest)
  • United States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir.) (probable cause to search under totality of circumstances)
  • United States v. Allison, 953 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir.) (collective knowledge doctrine)
  • United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d 1 (11th Cir.) (objective probable-cause inquiry; officer intent irrelevant)
  • Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (subjective intent irrelevant in Fourth Amendment analysis)
  • Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (alternative justifications for seizures evaluated objectively)
  • United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir.) (Terry-stop principles applied to investigatory stops)
  • Hensley v. Rivera, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (reliance on flyers/BOLOs justified Terry stops)
  • United States v. Griffin, 696 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir.) (scope of Terry stop and safety measures)
  • United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.) (officers may require occupants to exit vehicle during traffic stop)
  • United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir.) (handcuffing permissible when officer reasonably believes suspect is dangerous)
  • United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.) (when detention becomes de facto arrest)
  • United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir.) (factors for determining whether detention exceeded Terry bounds)
  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires Miranda warnings)
  • Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (ordinary traffic stops not custodial for Miranda purposes)
  • United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir.) (objective test for custody under Miranda)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Chad Lamar Hogan
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Apr 10, 2017
Citation: 684 F. App'x 904
Docket Number: 16-13226 Non-Argument Calendar
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.