United States v. Cesar Veloz-Alonso
910 F.3d 266
| 6th Cir. | 2018Background
- Cesar Veloz-Alonso, a Mexican national with prior removals, illegally reentered the U.S. and was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1326 for illegal reentry; he pleaded guilty and sought release on bail pending sentencing.
- Under the Bail Reform Act (BRA), a defendant who has pleaded guilty must be detained pending sentencing unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence he is not a flight risk or danger.
- ICE had a reinstated final removal order against Veloz-Alonso under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and asserted mandatory authority to detain and deport him.
- The district court granted release under the BRA (electronic monitoring and property lien) and, finding a statutory conflict and raising separation-of-powers concerns, enjoined ICE from detaining or deporting Veloz-Alonso pending sentencing.
- The government appealed, arguing the district court erred in finding a conflict between the BRA and INA and in preventing ICE from carrying out its statutory duties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the BRA supersedes INA so ICE cannot detain/deport a defendant released under BRA | Veloz-Alonso: BRA release authority during Article III proceedings prevents ICE from detaining/deporting while criminal case proceeds | Government: INA mandates detention/deportation for aliens with final removal orders; BRA does not strip ICE of statutory duties | BRA does not supersede INA; ICE may detain/deport despite a BRA-based release determination |
| Whether district court may enjoin ICE from executing INA removal duties pending sentencing | Veloz-Alonso: court may enjoin to protect judicial proceedings and ensure access to sentencing | Government: district court lacks authority to enjoin ICE from fulfilling mandatory statutory obligations | Court reversed district court’s injunction; enjoinment was improper as a matter of law |
| Whether there is a statutory conflict requiring courts to choose between prosecution and removal | Veloz-Alonso: Trujillo-Alvarez line suggests Executive must choose prosecution or removal, creating a conflict | Government: statutes can coexist; BRA’s permissive release does not negate INA’s mandatory detention | No conflict; statutes can be read to coexist and both are effective absent clear congressional intent otherwise |
| Whether release under BRA renders ICE’s detention a ‘‘release’’ under INA (affecting mandatory duties) | Veloz-Alonso: ICE can exercise discretion to "release" custody to prosecutors, avoiding mandatory detention | Government: transferring custody or using U.S. Marshals is not an INA-mandated "release" and does not negate INA duties | Court rejected Veloz-Alonso’s premise; such transfers do not convert INA’s detention mandate into permissive release |
Key Cases Cited
- Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (canon: when statutes can coexist, courts should regard each as effective absent clear contrary intent)
- United States v. Christman, 596 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2010) (standard of review for release-pending-sentencing factual findings)
- United States v. Trujillo-Alvarez, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Or. 2012) (district-court decision holding BRA supersedes INA in prosecution-vs-removal tension)
- United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1985) (precedent cited for review standards)