United States v. Cecelia Bradley
692 F. App'x 118
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- On May 14, 2013, Cecelia Bradley and associates drove to a campground on the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians reservation; a confrontation ensued in which Bradley struck Shirley Crowe and her brother Moses Reed stabbed William Bird. Bird was hospitalized; Crowe treated and released.
- A federal grand jury indicted Bradley on seven counts: one attempted murder and six assaults; only Count VII charged the assault on Crowe. Counts I–VI involved Bird.
- Bradley pled guilty to Count VII (assault on Crowe) and signed a plea agreement defining "relevant conduct" to include conduct pertaining to dismissed counts or uncharged conduct and agreeing to pay full restitution to all victims directly or indirectly harmed by her relevant conduct. The factual basis named both Bird and Crowe as victims.
- At sentencing the Cherokee Tribe sought restitution for both victims’ medical bills; Bradley objected to restitution for Bird, arguing she did not cause Bird’s injuries and Bird is not a "victim" under the VWPA or MVRA.
- The district court found the assault on Bird was relevant conduct, that Bradley acted in concert with Reed, and ordered Bradley to pay $37,500.15 in restitution (including $32,216.83 for Bird). Bradley appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Bradley's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plea agreement authorizes restitution for Bird though Bradley pled only to assault of Crowe | Bradley: plea limits restitution to "victims" of the offense she pled to; Bird is not her victim | Gov: plea defined "relevant conduct" to include dismissed/uncharged conduct and jointly undertaken activity, so Bird is covered | Held: Plea agreement permits restitution for Bird because his assault was relevant conduct under the agreement |
| Whether Bird qualifies as a victim under VWPA/MVRA (affecting restitution scope) | Bradley: Bird is not a "victim" of her offense, so restitution is improper | Gov: statutory victim definitions aside, parties’ plea agreement can authorize restitution to non-victims | Held: Statutes allow restitution by plea agreement; dispositive issue is contract terms, not statutory label |
| Whether Bird’s injuries were caused by Bradley’s conduct (causation/foreseeability in jointly undertaken activity) | Bradley: she did not stab Bird and did not cause his injuries | Gov: Bradley joined the assault in concert; Reed’s acts were within scope and reasonably foreseeable | Held: District court did not clearly err — acts were jointly undertaken and Bird’s assault was reasonably foreseeable, so attributable to Bradley |
| Applicability of United States v. Squirrel as a limiting precedent | Bradley: Squirrel suggests post-event conduct not relevant for restitution | Gov: Squirrel differs — defendants there only acted after victim’s death; here assaults were concurrent | Held: Squirrel is distinguishable and does not bar restitution here |
Key Cases Cited
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plea bargains are essentially contracts)
- United States v. Abdelbary, 746 F.3d 570 (4th Cir. 2014) (de novo review for plea-interpretation and statutory construction)
- United States v. Gilliam, 987 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1993) (acts of co-participants attributable if within scope and reasonably foreseeable)
- United States v. Squirrel, 588 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2009) (limitations on restitution where defendant's conduct occurred only after the loss and was not in concert with actor causing loss)
Outcome: Affirmed — district court’s restitution order stands.