United States v. Castro-Vazquez
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15857
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- Castro-Vazquez was arrested at a gas station on Sept. 26, 2012 after officers observed a bulge on his waist and found a firearm; charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- On the eve of trial he filed a motion to suppress the firearm and phone; the district court refused to rule pretrial and said suppression could be raised at trial.
- Co-defendant Miranda‑Melendez litigated suppression at trial and obtained suppression and dismissal; Castro‑Vazquez instead pleaded guilty unconditionally before jury empanelment.
- At sentencing the court applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2)’s 10‑level prior‑felony enhancement (total offense level 22), relying on the presentence report listing burglary, robbery, and drug convictions; sentence 78 months.
- On appeal the First Circuit affirmed the conviction (plea waiver), but vacated and remanded the sentence because the district court may have misapplied Descamps/ categorical analysis in counting prior burglary and robbery convictions as "crimes of violence."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Castro‑Vazquez’s unconditional guilty plea waive pretrial suppression error? | Castro‑Vazquez: motion timely; court erred by not ruling pretrial. | Government: plea was voluntary; pre‑plea errors waived. | Court: Plea was voluntary; under Tollett plea waived independent pretrial claims, so conviction affirmed. |
| Was counsel ineffective for advising plea instead of pursuing suppression? | Castro‑Vazquez: counsel failed to advise him to go to trial on a strong suppression motion. | Government: record inadequately developed to resolve ineffective‑assistance on direct appeal. | Court: Ineffective‑assistance claim is fact‑dependent; decline to decide on direct appeal; may be asserted under §2255. |
| Did district court plainly err in applying §2K2.1(a)(2) by treating Puerto Rico burglary as a "crime of violence"? | Castro‑Vazquez: Puerto Rico burglary is overbroad (no unlawful‑entry element) and may be misdemeanor. | Government: relied on presentence report; on appeal narrowed to burglary/robbery as predicates. | Court: Remand required — district court relied on facts rather than Descamps categorical analysis; must reassess whether burglary qualifies and whether it was a felony. |
| Did robbery convictions qualify as "crimes of violence" (elements: "violence" or "intimidation") or via residual clause? | Castro‑Vazquez: "intimidation" may be mere moral pressure and "violence" may be minimal force — may not meet "physical force" requirement; residual clause also questionable after Johnson. | Government: initially relied on robbery; disclaimed residual‑clause reliance on appeal but may attempt to prove predicates on remand. | Court: Remand required to apply Descamps/modified categorical approach to robbery statute; if government relies on residual clause, constitutional question (Johnson) must be addressed on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (unconditional guilty plea waives antecedent non‑jurisdictional constitutional claims)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (elements‑based categorical approach; modified approach only for divisible statutes using Shepard materials)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague — implicated guidelines residual clause question)
- United States v. Ramirez, 708 F.3d 295 (1st Cir. 2013) (definition of "crime of violence" and "physical force" analysis)
- United States v. Serrano‑Mercado, 784 F.3d 838 (1st Cir. 2015) (plain‑error review and effect of intervening law on plain‑error analysis)