United States v. Castrillon-Sanchez, 861 F.3d 26

Background

Rosa E. Castrillón-Sánchez led a multi-year (2005–2010) fraud scheme that induced over 90 victims to provide more than $5 million through false claims about being a beneficiary of frozen funds, use of victims’ personal information, fraudulent loan paperwork, threats, and lulling payments.
A federal grand jury charged Castrillón and others in July 2010; she pleaded guilty in December 2013 to conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349) and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A). Other counts were dismissed.
The plea agreement calculated a Guidelines offense level of 31 for the conspiracy count (range 108–135 months assuming Criminal History I) and noted the mandatory consecutive 24 months for identity theft, recommending 132 months total.
The PSR added a two-level enhancement for vulnerable victims (elderly/unsophisticated), raising the offense level to 33 and (with Criminal History II) producing a 151–188 month range; the district court adopted level 33 but found Criminal History I, yielding a 135–168 month range.
The district court imposed 135 months on the conspiracy count (low end of its adopted Guidelines range) plus the consecutive 24 months for identity theft, totaling 159 months, citing offense gravity, victim suffering, leadership role, duration, and loss amount.
On appeal Castrillón challenged only the substantive reasonableness of the sentence; she argued mitigating factors (gambling disorder, rehabilitation, low recidivism risk, remorse, comparative disparities) warranted a lower term.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Castrillón’s within-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable	N/A (government sought affirmance)	Castrillón argued mitigating factors and alleged double counting (vulnerable-victim enhancement) made the sentence excessive	Affirmed: sentence substantively reasonable because it rests on a plausible rationale and is within Guidelines range
Whether the PSR’s vulnerable-victim enhancement improperly double-counted other enhancements	Government/PSR maintained enhancement was appropriate given victims’ vulnerability	Castrillón said the enhancement duplicated other increases and overstated culpability	Court upheld enhancement as part of district court’s sentencing calculus; district court adopted level 33 and justified its weighing
Applicable standard of appellate review for the substantive challenge	Government argued waiver and that review should be limited; alternatively abuse-of-discretion	Castrillón sought reversal under abuse-of-discretion (or plain error)	Court applied abuse-of-discretion (noting some ambiguity when unpreserved) and found no abuse
Whether mitigating personal circumstances required a materially lower sentence	N/A	Castrillón urged that gambling addiction, family separation, remorse, rehabilitation, and sentence disparities warranted leniency	District court permissibly weighed those factors but rejected them as insufficient to overcome offense gravity; appellate court affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223 (1st Cir. 2015) (standard for reviewing substantive-reasonableness challenges)
Martin, 520 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (there is a range of reasonable sentences; reversal only if outside that universe)
Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194 (1st Cir. 2006) (heavy burden to overturn within-Guidelines sentence)
Vega-Salgado, 769 F.3d 100 (1st Cir. 2014) (supporting deference to within-Guidelines sentences)
King, 741 F.3d 305 (1st Cir. 2014) (same)
Clogston, 662 F.3d 588 (1st Cir. 2011) (district court’s differing valuation of mitigating factors does not render sentence unreasonable)
Colón-Rodríguez, 696 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2012) (similar deference to district court’s balancing of § 3553(a) factors)
Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2010) (upholding within-Guidelines sentence where court adequately weighed offense and offender)