United States v. Casey
825 F.3d 1
1st Cir.2016Background
- On Aug. 1, 2005, PRPD Agent Jesús Lizardi (undercover) failed to return from a planned drug buy; his body was later found in Luquillo. DNA linked Lizardi to items recovered (truck, flip-flops, $20 bill).
- Lashaun Casey (defendant) was arrested that day; police searched his bedroom in his grandparents’ house with the grandparents’ consent and found a gun, Lizardi’s phone, and blood-stained flip-flops.
- Casey made various custodial statements (some after invoking Miranda rights) and spoke to his common-law wife while an agent overheard; a parking-lot cashier later identified Casey from a photo array.
- Indicted on carjacking resulting in death, firearm offense causing death, and felon-in-possession; government sought death penalty but jury returned life sentence.
- Pretrial and trial disputes included: Batson challenge to peremptory strikes, suppression of bedroom-search evidence, admissibility of photo-array ID, Miranda issues, limits on cross-examination about PRPD investigative failures, expert/DNA witness confrontation objections, and a recusal motion.
Issues
| Issue | Casey's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Batson/peremptory strikes | Prosecutor struck three black panelists; court should infer racial motivation | Strikes were race-neutral: jurors were reluctant to impose death penalty | Court found district misapplied Powers but any Batson error was harmless; challenge denied |
| Bedroom search (third-party consent) | Grandparents lacked authority; search was warrantless and evidence should be suppressed | Riveras consented and represented they had access to the room; officers reasonably relied on apparent authority | Affirmed: district court credited officers; Riveras had apparent authority and consent was voluntary |
| Photo-array ID (Algarín) | Array was suggestive (Casey darkest skin / unique features) and witness pressured; ID unreliable | Array included six similar photos; witness had adequate opportunity and certainty | Affirmed: not unduly suggestive and, under totality, reliable; denial of suppression proper |
| Miranda / custodial statements & statements to wife | Statements after invocation of rights should be suppressed; in-custody spousal statements were interrogation-equivalent | Officers honored Miranda in part; some post-invocation statements properly suppressed, others volunteered; spouse visit was not interrogation | Affirmed: district suppressed portion after invocation but admitted earlier/volunteered statements; spouse conversation admissible |
| Confrontation and testimonial hearsay (DNA reports) | Admission via surrogate witness violated Crawford/Bullcoming — defendant denied right to confront analyst | Defense counsel expressly waived objections at trial; government produced surrogate witness who authenticated reports | Waiver: defendant affirmatively declined to object at trial; plain-error review not reached; claim denied |
| Limits on cross-examination / expert & internal-report evidence | Exclusion of internal-PRPD report, police-practices expert, and limits on impeachment deprived Casey of ability to show investigative tunnel vision and implicate another suspect (Hernández) | Limitations were proper (relevance, hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, Daubert concerns, risk of juror confusion) | Affirmed: rulings within discretion; excluded evidence was tangential and errors (if any) harmless cumulatively |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (peremptory strikes based on race violate Equal Protection)
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1991) (defendant may object to race-based exclusion of jurors even if juror and defendant are not same race)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (U.S. 1990) (apparent authority: officers may rely on reasonable belief a third party can consent)
- Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974) (common authority permits third-party consent to search)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (consent voluntariness assessed under totality of circumstances)
- Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (U.S. 1964) (property interest alone does not permit third-party consent)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (U.S. 1977) (standards for reliability of identification evidence)
- Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (U.S. 1975) (invocation of right to cut off questioning must be scrupulously honored)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause limits hearsay testimonial evidence)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (forensic certificates are testimonial)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (U.S. 2011) (surrogate testimony may violate Confrontation Clause when lab analyst does not testify)