United States v. Casellas-Toro, 807 F.3d 380

Pablo Casellas-Toro reported an armed carjacking (June 17, 2012); FBI took custody of his car after he gave written consent to search on June 25.
Casellas’s wife was murdered July 14, 2012; Casellas became the prime suspect, tried and convicted in Commonwealth court (Dec. 2013–Jan. 2014) and sentenced to 109 years.
Federal indictment (false statements to a federal officer) followed his Commonwealth conviction; federal voir dire began ~two months after the Commonwealth sentencing.
Massive, sensational local media coverage (including live broadcasts of arrest, trial, sentencing, and widespread rumors) permeated Puerto Rico; nearly the entire venire knew of the murder and many knew related facts.
District court denied change of venue after extensive individual voir dire and empaneled a jury; jury convicted on three counts but the court later granted judgment of acquittal on two counts and sentenced on one.
Casellas appealed denial of change of venue and denial of motion to suppress evidence from two searches of his car (consent-based search and later warrant search).

Issue	Casellas’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether court should have changed venue because prejudicial pretrial publicity required presumption of juror bias	Pretrial publicity was massive, sensational, intertwined with the Commonwealth murder conviction and sentencing two months earlier, making a fair jury in PR virtually impossible	Voir dire and individual questioning could reveal impartial jurors; transfer unnecessary because jurors could be found who would be fair	Reversed: court should have granted change of venue — presumption of prejudice applies and government failed to rebut it
Whether FBI’s warrantless search of car (after written consent) was invalid because Casellas revoked consent by calling agents before the search	Phone calls asking for the car back amounted to implicit revocation of consent, so the July 16 search (and thus evidence for the later warrant) should be suppressed	Calls were inquiries about timing; Casellas never expressly withdrew consent; search was within a reasonable time and later warrant was supported	Affirmed as to consent: district court did not clearly err — consent remained and 21-day interval was reasonable; suppression denied

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (televised confession so pervasive that due process required change of venue)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (four-factor test for presumed prejudice; significance of intertwined jury verdicts and publicity timing)
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (extensive pretrial publicity and high for-cause dismissals demonstrate community prejudice)
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (deference to trial court’s findings on juror impartiality; high standard to overturn)
United States v. Quiles-Olivo, 684 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 2012) (abuse-of-discretion review and standards for presumed prejudice)
United States v. Misla-Aldarondo, 478 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (presumed prejudice when publicity saturates community)
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (passage of time can dissipate prejudicial publicity)
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) (mere prior knowledge is insufficient to presume prejudice)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent invalid where yielded to assertion of legal authority)
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (scope of consent measured by objective reasonable person standard)