85 F.4th 602
1st Cir.2023Background:
- On June 13, 2019, Richard Tonks was found dead; toxicology showed fentanyl and cocaine. No autopsy was performed and the needle's contents were not tested.
- Texts and Facebook messages between Tonks and Bernardito Carvajal documented repeated sales of "white" and "brown" (alleged slang for cocaine and fentanyl) in the days before Tonks's death.
- On July 31, 2019, an undercover buy-bust arrested Carvajal after he sold fentanyl; testing confirmed the substance was fentanyl.
- A federal jury convicted Carvajal of distributing fentanyl (two counts) but acquitted him of distributing cocaine and of causing Tonks's death.
- At sentencing the district court denied a two-level Guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility, found by a preponderance of the evidence (relying on trial testimony) that Carvajal's sales caused Tonks's death, and imposed a 120-month sentence (above the PSR Guidelines range of 51–63 months) as an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
- Carvajal appealed, arguing the court improperly relied on acquitted conduct (violating due process) and should have granted the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eligibility for § 3E1.1 acceptance-of-responsibility reduction | Carvajal did not accept responsibility at sentencing; reduction not warranted | Carvajal: his opening statement admitting sales shows acceptance and entitlement to 2-level reduction | Denied — no pretrial admissions or conduct showing "rare situation"; trial statements alone insufficient. |
| Use of acquitted conduct at sentencing | Court may consider acquitted conduct if proved by preponderance; justifies upward sentence | Carvajal: using acquitted conduct to increase sentence violates due process and jury trial rights | Rejected — controlling precedent allows consideration of acquitted conduct under preponderance standard. |
| Factual finding that defendant caused death | Government: preponderance of evidence (experts + messages) shows Carvajal supplied both drugs and caused death | Carvajal: expert conflicts, lack of autopsy, ambiguous slang, jury acquitted on death causation | Affirmed — district court credibility determinations and reliance on record not clearly erroneous. |
| Substantive reasonableness of 120-month variance | Government: § 3553(a) factors (seriousness, deterrence, impact) justify upward variance | Carvajal: variance improperly punishes acquitted conduct; excessive compared to Guidelines and precedent | Affirmed — sentence within statutory maximum, not an extreme Lombard case; variance was plausible and defensible. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Watts, [citation="519 U.S. 148"] (per curiam) (upholding judge consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing under preponderance standard)
- United States v. Meléndez-González, [citation="892 F.3d 9"] (1st Cir. 2018) (First Circuit permits consideration of acquitted conduct if proved by preponderance)
- United States v. Martí-Lón, [citation="524 F.3d 295"] (1st Cir. 2008) (same ruling on acquitted conduct at sentencing)
- United States v. Lombard, [citation="72 F.3d 170"] (1st Cir. 1995) (extreme-case limit on sentencing based on acquitted conduct)
- Gall v. United States, [citation="552 U.S. 38"] (2007) (standard for reviewing substantive reasonableness of variances under § 3553(a))
- United States v. Ofray-Campos, [citation="534 F.3d 1"] (1st Cir. 2008) (district court must provide especially compelling reasons for very large variances that double-count Guidelines factors)
- United States v. Heindenstrom, [citation="946 F.3d 57"] (1st Cir. 2019) (approved substantial upward variance in context; used for comparative analysis)
- United States v. Deppe, [citation="509 F.3d 54"] (1st Cir. 2007) (explains that acceptance-of-responsibility credit is normally unavailable to defendants who go to trial except in rare situations)
