United States v. Carter Tillery
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25884
4th Cir.2012Background
- Tillery was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, sentenced to 360 months total, and appealed.
- August 1, 2009, Swan Dry Cleaners in Petersburg, VA was robbed at gunpoint; the clerk was detained and the robber fled after ~10–15 minutes.
- The robber stole a laptop from the clerk; that laptop later resurfaced in a barbershop and was traced to Tillery via a photo array and later identification by Cho.
- Detective Harris later located shotguns at nearby motels; Tillery resided there in 2009 and was later incarcerated on unrelated charges.
- In June 2010, while imprisoned, Tillery confessed to the robbery to his cellmate, describing details of the crime.
- Indictment was returned August 4, 2010; trial occurred December 14–15, 2010; convictions on both counts followed; sentence imposed August 1, 2011.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hobbs Act jurisdiction minimal effect | Tillery contends the theft of only $40–$100 cannot affect interstate commerce. | Government shows the robbed business is part of an interstate supply chain; depletion of assets satisfies minimal effect. | Hobbs Act jurisdiction satisfied; depletion of assets of an inherently economic enterprise supports minimal effect. |
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict | Conflicting identifications undermine guilt; Cho's testimony is inconsistent and insufficient alone. | Additional testimony (Pulliam’s identification, cellmate confession) corroborates guilt. | Sufficient evidence supported conviction; multiple corroborating sources established identity. |
| Jury instructions plain error | District court overemphasized unanimity; instruction could mislead deliberations. | No plain error; instruction read in full with context showed no improper coercion. | No plain error; instructions viewed in context did not improperly coerce verdict. |
| Career offender designation | Eluding police is not a crime of violence and cannot count as a qualifying prior. | Virginia eluding statute creates inherent risk; Hudson controls that intentional flight is a violent felony. | Eluding police constitutes a crime of violence; valid career offender designation. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2003) (minimal effect test for Hobbs Act jurisdiction)
- United States v. Spagnolo, 546 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir. 1976) (interstate commerce nexus for Hobbs Act)
- Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (Supreme Court 1960) (commerce predicate for Hobbs Act)
- United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402 (4th Cir. 1990) (robbery affecting interstate commerce via inherently economic enterprise)
- United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2002) (robbery of out-of-state-supplied inventory satisfies Hobbs Act)
- United States v. Singleton, 178 F. App’x 259 (4th Cir. 2006) (business with out-of-state suppliers engages in interstate commerce)
- United States v. Mohamadi, Taken from text (4th Cir. 2012) (robbery affecting interstate commerce)
- United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566 (4th Cir. 2011) (prohibition on inquiring into jury’s numerical division)
- United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2012) (intentional vehicular flight as crime of violence)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (Supreme Court 2011) (vehicle flight inherent risk of violence supports crime of violence)