917 F.3d 1043
8th Cir.2019Background
- Roman pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and faced a PSR that classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
- The career-offender designation relied on at least two prior felony convictions, including a 2012 Illinois aggravated battery on a public way conviction.
- Roman argued at sentencing and on appeal that the Illinois aggravated-battery conviction is not a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines’ force clause because the statute can be satisfied by nonviolent, insulting contact.
- The district court adopted the PSR, treated Roman as a career offender, and sentenced him to 220 months’ imprisonment.
- The Eighth Circuit applied the categorical/modified categorical approach to the Illinois statutory elements and the plea documents to determine whether the conviction necessarily involved the use of physical force.
- The court concluded Roman pleaded to the “causing bodily harm” alternative of Illinois simple battery (an element that requires force), so the aggravated-battery conviction qualifies as a crime of violence and the career-offender classification stands.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roman’s Illinois aggravated-battery conviction is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) | Roman: The Illinois statute is divisible and can be violated by insulting or provocative contact that does not require violent physical force. | Government: Roman pleaded to the "causing bodily harm" alternative, which requires the use of physical force and thus meets the Guidelines’ force clause. | The conviction involved the "causing bodily harm" definition; it requires physical force and therefore is a crime of violence. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 899 F.3d 659 (8th Cir.) (standard of de novo review for crime-of-violence determinations)
- United States v. Harris, 907 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir.) (quoting Guidelines’ force-clause definition of crime of violence)
- United States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir.) (explaining categorical and modified categorical approaches)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing divisible statutes and authorizing the modified categorical approach)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (describing categorical approach principles)
- United States v. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786 (7th Cir.) (analyzing Illinois simple battery as divisible and treating "causing bodily harm" as a force-based alternative)