27 F.4th 1323
8th Cir.2022Background
- Hutchinson was stopped in Iowa; officers found a pistol and ammunition; he pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (g)(3).
- A PSIR identified three prior Texas burglary convictions and recommended ACCA enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), producing a mandatory minimum 15-year term.
- Two indictments alleged entry with intent to commit theft, but Hutchinson challenged whether Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) matches the Taylor generic-burglary definition because it lacks an explicit pre-entry specific-intent element.
- The district court adopted the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Herrold and concluded § 30.02(a)(3) contains the requisite specific-intent requirement, treating Hutchinson as an armed career criminal.
- Hutchinson appealed the ACCA enhancement; the Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether § 30.02(a)(3) requires specific intent to commit a crime and affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) is a categorical match to generic burglary for ACCA purposes | Hutchinson: the statute is indivisible but § 30.02(a)(3) lacks the specific-intent element required by Taylor and thus is broader than generic burglary | Government/District Court: Texas law and precedent (including DeVaughn and Herrold) show § 30.02(a)(3) inherently requires intent and therefore matches Taylor | Court: Affirmed; § 30.02(a)(3) contains the generic specific-intent requirement so Hutchinson’s Texas burglary convictions qualify as ACCA predicates; did not resolve timing-of-intent question |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (defines generic burglary for ACCA)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- United States v. Herrold, 941 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.) (construing Texas § 30.02(a)(3) as satisfying generic burglary)
- United States v. Pena, 952 F.3d 503 (4th Cir.) (Texas burglary qualifies as generic burglary)
- Van Cannon v. United States, 890 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.) (similar-state statute held broader than generic burglary)
- Gonzalez v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 654 (8th Cir.) (discussing realistic-probability test under categorical approach)
- DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Crim. App.) (Texas court explaining that an attempted or completed crime under § 30.02(a)(3) supplants the specific-intent language in other subsections)
- Duenas-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 183 (framework for realistic-probability inquiry)
